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Abstract 
This thesis aims to explain and discuss the concept of automation in Managed Pressure 
Drilling systems and how this may influence the risk of well control incidents by its 
effect on human performance, focusing on human errors. The scope also includes 
examining the change of mode of automation during a well control incident, and 
recommend for a future mode of automation from a human factor point of view. An 
MPD system developed by Halliburton AS was used as a case, while the critical well 
control incident, lost circulation, formed the scenario. Researchers and technical 
professionals also shared their point of view in possibilities and challenges with MPD.  
The petroleum industry in seeking improved technologies to drill wells with a narrow 
drilling window, such as depleted reservoirs. Automated MPD has addressed this 
challenge with dedicated pressure control equipment. A higher mode of automation may 
reduce some risks, such as kicks and losses. However, it may also introduce new types 
of safety issues that affect the risk of human error. The Norwegian Petroleum Safety 
Authority requires systems and equipment to be designed such that the possibility of 
human error is limited. NORSOK S-002 requires the execution of analysis to ensure 
that the potential for human error in work systems is minimized. Methods utilized in 
this thesis were the functional analysis, FAST, allocation of functions, task analysis, and 
a systematic human error reduction and prediction approach, SHERPA.  
Functions required to maintain bottomhole pressure within drilling window was 
identified with FAST. The analysis demonstrated a more complex primary well control 
than for conventional drilling. Allocation of functions to human and machine illustrated 
that the backpressure pump and the MPD choke are automatically controlled during 
drilling (Mode 3 Management by Delegation), while manually handled during lost 
circulation (Mode 1 Assisted Manual Control). Allocation of functions and the task 
analysis clarified a frequent change in task responsibilities between the driller and the 
MPD operator. SHERPA found that errors made by the driller or the MPD operator 
could lead to failure of filling the well adequately with mud during losses, which 
initiates a kick. If the blowout-preventer is not closed, it could result in the kick 
developing into a blowout. A clear instruction on when to close the BOP was not found, 
with limitations of time and information available to confirm this finding.  
A future mode of automation in MPD systems is recommended to be similar to today’s 
situation. The operation is then enhanced during drilling, while allowing the operator to 
intervene to varying degrees in case of abnormal operation. This could provide benefits 
such as improved situation awareness, workload, and overall human-machine 
performance. However, the increase in complexity, coupled with team-work previously 
not found in traditional drilling methods, may suggest that communication, interaction 
between different operators, and mistaken judgments are vulnerable aspects. These 
findings combined with changed task demands propose that automated MPD introduces 
new types of human errors that could influence risks prior to and during a well control 
incidents. Still, the MPD equipment offers a more precise adjustment of the bottomhole 
pressure proposing that some well control incidents are more simplified to handle. 
Incorporating the human element in major accident risk analyses has been suggested to 
be a promising path to improve safety and reliability in safety-critical system.  
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Sammendrag 
Denne oppgaven tar sikte på å forklare og diskutere begrepet automatisering i 
trykkbalanserte (MPD) boresystemer og hvordan dette kan påvirke risikoen for 
brønnkontrollhendelser ved automatiseringens effekt på menneskelig ytelse. Fokuset til 
rettes mot menneskelige feil. Arbeidet inkluderer også det å undersøke endring av 
automasjonsmodus under en brønnkontrollhendelse, og å anbefale en fremtidig modus 
for automasjon av MPD-systemer fra en menneskelig faktors ståsted. Et trykkbalansert 
system utviklet av Halliburton AS vil bli brukt som et eksempel, hvor tap av borevæske 
til formasjonen vil representere en uønsket brønnkontrollhendelse.  
Petroleumsindustrien søker forbedret teknologi for å bore brønner med et smalt 
borevindu, for eksempel depleterte reservoarer. Automatisert MPD har adressert denne 
utfordringen med dedikert trykkontrollutstyr. Et høyere modus av automasjon kan 
redusere noe risiko, for eksempel brønnspark og tap av borevæske. Likevel kan det også 
introdusere nye typer sikkerhetsproblemer som påvirker risikoen for menneskelige feil. 
Petroleumstilsynet krever at systemer og utstyr skal være utformet slik at muligheten for 
menneskelige feil er begrenset. NORSOK S-002 krever utførelse av ulike analyser for å 
sikre at muligheten for menneskelige feil i arbeidssystemer er redusert. Metoder 
benyttet i denne avhandlingen var funksjonsanalysen ―FAST‖, fordeling av funksjoner, 
oppgaveanalyse, og en menneskelig feilanalyse, SHERPA.  
Funksjoner som kreves for å opprettholde bunnhullstrykk innenfor borevinduet ble 
identifisert med FAST. Analysen viste en mer kompleks primærbrønnkontroll enn for 
konvensjonell boring. Tildeling av disse funksjonene til menneske og maskin illustrerte 
at mottrykkspumpen og MPD choke manifold blir automatisk kontrollert under boring 
(Modus 3 Ledelse ved delegasjon), mens de blir manuelt håndtert under tap av 
borevæske (Modus 1 Manuell kontroll). Tildeling av funksjoner og oppgaveanalyse 
avklarte en hyppig endring i oppgave/funksjonsansvar mellom boreren og MPD-
operatøren. SHERPA eksponerte at menneskelige feil utført av boreren eller MPD-
operatøren kan føre til svikt i å fylle brønnen tilstrekkelig med borevæske under tap. En 
unnlatelse av å ikke lukke utblåsningssikringen kan resultere i at et brønnspark utvikles 
til en utblåsning. En klar instruks om når boreren bør lukke BOP ble ikke funnet, med 
begrensninger i tid og informasjon tilgjengelig for å bekrefte dette resultatet. 
En fremtidig modus av automasjon i MPD-systemer anbefales å være lik dagens 
situasjon. Operasjonen blir da forbedret under boringen, samtidig som den tillater at 
operatøren kan gripe inn i varierende grad i tilfelle en brønnkontrollsituasjon oppstår. 
Dette kan gi fordeler som bedrer situasjonsbevissthet og generelt bedrer menneske-
maskin-ytelse. Økningen i kompleksitet, kombinert med samarbeidet som tidligere ikke 
var i tradisjonelle boremetoder, kan dog tyde på at kommunikasjon, samhandling 
mellom ulike aktører, og feilaktige avgjørelser er sårbare sider. Disse funnene, 
kombinert med endrede type oppgaver, antyder at automatisert MPD introduserer nye 
typer menneskelige feil som kan påvirke risikoen før og under brønnkontrollhendelser. 
Likevel gir MPD-utstyret en mer presis regulering av bunnhullstrykk, noe som foreslås 
å gjøre brønnkontrollhendelser enklere å håndtere. Å innlemme det menneskelige 
element i storulykkesrisiko-analyser er foreslått å være en lovende vei for å bedre 
sikkerhet og pålitelighet i sikkerhetskritisk system. 
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1 Introduction 
Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD) has received considerable attention during the last 
years. One of the reasons is an apparent demand for new drilling technologies to drill 
narrow mud window formations, e.g. fractured formations, depleted reservoirs, and 
deep water formations. Summarized, these challenges give a drive for improving well 
control compared with conventional practice.  
For conventional drilling, the annular hydraulic bottomhole pressure (BHP) can vary 
with hundreds of psi when changing from static to dynamic condition. Hence, drilling 
narrow pressure formations can be considered impractical or even unsafe using 
conventional drilling technology. To prevent large BHP variations, such as when rig 
pumps are being switched from on to off (and vice versa), MPD systems may introduce 
dedicated MPD pressure control equipment for this purpose.  
 
1.1 Problem Definition 
Management of risks during drilling operations is ensured by the use of a primary and a 
secondary well barrier. The main purpose of the primary barrier is to prevent 
uncontrolled influx, whereas the secondary barrier is used to mitigate loss of control in 
case the primary barrier fails. While conventional drilling operations use the mud 
column weight as the primary well barrier, MPD systems typically apply non-
conventional equipment for active control of BHP. As part of an integrated operation 
(IO), MPD gives a more precise control of BHP which may reduce risks for kicks and 
losses compared with conventional methods, particular when drilling in narrow mud 
windows.  
At the same time, however, lack of experience with the technology and new ways of 
managing drilling operations may introduce new hazards and potential hazardous 
events. The introduction and development of new technology allows for automation of 
operated well control functions that were previously manually handled (Saeed et al. 
2012). While introducing a higher mode of automation may lead to optimal 
performance, it also introduces new safety issues that need to be addressed to ensure 
safe operational conditions. Hard learned lessons from other industries, such as aviation, 
have in some cases revealed opposite effect by implementation of automatic functions 
planned to reduce risk and increase effectiveness (Thorogood et al. 2010).  
Recent studies also suggest that the use of drilling support systems and levels/types of 
automation may influence the driller’s performance and risk of potential human error. 
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For instance, increased level of automation may lead to mode confusion, i.e., a situation 
where the technical system behaves differently than the operators expect (Iversen et al. 
2012). Because the work distribution between the automation system and the driller 
changes for each increased mode of automation, a clear understanding of human-
machine interaction is needed (Breyholtz & Nikolaou 2012).  
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authorities entails installations, systems, and 
equipment to be designed such that the possibility of human error is limited (PSA 
2008). The Norwegian petroleum standards (NORSOK) also states that during project 
development, analyses shall be performed to minimize the potential for human error in 
work systems that control safety critical activities on the installation. Further, NORSOK 
defines that during concept definition of systems, the activity shall include a functional 
analysis and allocation describing functions to be performed, defining system 
performance requirements, and allocating manual and/or automatic functions. In 
addition, a task analysis defining tasks based on allocated functions shall be performed 
(NORSOK 2008). 
 
1.2 Objectives 
This thesis aims to explain and discuss the concept of automation in Managed Pressure 
Drilling (MPD) systems and how this may influence the risk of well control incidents 
by its effect on human performance, focusing on human errors. Tasks to be performed: 
1. Establish an MPD system description with case establishment. 
 
2. Make a brief review of methods for Human Factor and risk methods suitable for 
addressing this thesis’ objectives. Perform a selection of these methods on an 
MPD system, with focus on achieving system goals, such as primary well 
control. Discuss the quality of these methods to be used in this context. Further, 
look at which changes (modes of automation) occur in the human-machine 
interface during a well incident. 
 
3. Perform an empirical study to map challenges and possibilities with MPD. 
Discuss advantages and disadvantage of automation in relation to a major 
accident scenario and human errors.  
 
4. Give recommendations on level/mode of automation of future MPD systems 
from a Human Factor point of view.  
 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
The scope of this thesis was to examine automated Managed Pressure Drilling and the 
influence on risk of human errors in a well control incident. MPD is a general term for 
methods used to more precisely control pressure in the wellbore. This thesis was 
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restricted to study the method Constant Bottom Hole Pressure, as this is the method 
applied by Halliburton AS, the company utilized as a case throughout the thesis. 
Further, the framework was set to be on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, which 
implies that the MPD operation was performed on platforms and not on floating rigs 
where waves and bad weather may have an impact. In addition, system components of 
the MPD system were chosen to be those that are currently in operation in Norway (i.e. 
backpressure pump, and not rotating control device).     
The empirical study, described in Section 1.2, is delimited to include a pre-study, which 
means that researchers and technical professional were contacted on email and phone. 
They were not met in person due to the geographical positions of each participant. Their 
answers were used to reflect the relevance of the scope, and not directly to support the 
work performed in the thesis.  
As the objectives of the thesis are more focused towards a system’s vulnerabilities to 
human errors, and not to quantify such errors, the thesis was delimited to include 
qualitative research. The review of Human Factor methods contains those that were 
actually applied in the thesis. The well control incident chosen to be examined was lost 
circulation, as this is a critical situation with possibilities to escalate. System failures 
were not looked upon as a cause of human error when performing the different analyses. 
To delimit the qualitative research, performance shaping factors that could influence 
human errors were also excluded.   
During drilling operations offshore, a number of different people hold tasks that could 
have an influence on the scenario and the results of the analyses performed. These 
include, but are not limited to, the driller superintendent, toolpusher, driller, assistant 
driller, derrickman, directional driller, data operator, mud engineer, and two or three 
MPD operators. This thesis was mainly focused on the driller and the MPD operator’s 
roles in influencing the well control incident.   
 
 
1.4 Report Outline 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows 
Chapter 2 Contains an introduction to drilling technology where conventional 
drilling, managed pressure drilling, and Halliburton’s Geobalance system 
are described. Further, a section on safety explains well control, loss of 
well control with more information on lost circulation. The last part of 
chapter 2 holds human performance, with the subtopics automation, 
human-machine interactions and human error.     
 
Chapter 3 Describes the methods utilized to accomplish the objectives, which 
includes data collection, creating a scenario, and human factors methods; 
functional analysis, allocation of functions, task analysis, and human 
error identification.  
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Chapter 4 Presents the findings from the pre-study which includes possibilities and 
challenges with MPD, and the different analyses performed throughout 
the thesis. These are Functional Analysis System Technique, (FAST), 
allocation of functions with reference to Fitts list, a hierarchical task 
analysis on lost circulation, and Systematic Human Error Reduction and 
Prediction Approach (SHERPA). The section ends with a table that 
combines the different analyses.   
 
Chapter 5 Begins with a discussion on the results obtained from chapter 4 together 
with relevant theory from chapter 2. A recommendation is given for 
future mode of automation. The section continues with an evaluation of 
the methods used in the thesis. Strengths and limitations with the 
methodologies are given at the end.  
 
Chapter 6 Provide conclusions for the objectives and suggestions for further work.  
 
Chapter 7 Lists the references used in the thesis. 
 
Chapter 8 Gives the Appendix with abbreviations.  
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2 Theory 
This chapter will start with a simplified and short description of conventional drilling, 
the drilling fluid or drilling mud, and pressure terms. Knowledge about these topics is 
essential to understand why new drilling technologies are desired. Further, an 
introduction to the concept of managed pressure drilling (MPD) and Halliburton’s 
Geobalance system will be given. A section about safety will highlight well control, loss 
of well control, and a lost circulation event. The last part is about human performance 
and outlines the concept of automation, human-machine interaction, and human error. 
Finally, a review of human factor methods is provided. 
 
2.1 Drilling 
2.1.1 Conventional Drilling 
Drilling of wells is performed by drilling rigs such as the rig illustrated in Figure 1. The 
drillbit is attached to the drillstring, which again is attached to the motor, or topdrive, 
that rotates the drillstring. The topdrive sits within the derrick, and can be lowered and 
raised. During drilling, the drillstring is lowered towards the drill floor. After about 27 
meters, the drilling pauses while a new stand of drillpipe is connected to the top, called 
pipe connection, and then well drilling continues (Devereux 2012).   
 
Figure 1: The drilling rig Transocean Spitsbergen currently operated by Statoil. Obtained 
from Statoil.com. 
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Mud Circulation System 
During the drilling process, a mud, or drilling fluid circulation system is used. Mud is 
pumped from the storage tanks, or pits, through the suction line to the mud pumps. 
From the pumps, mud flows via the standpipe through the rotary hose and swivel, and 
into the topdrive before going through the drill string and out of nozzles in the drillbit. 
After entering the wellbore from the drillbit, the mud carries downhole cuttings up to 
the surface through the annulus between the drillstring and the formation being drilled. 
The cuttings are separated from the mud over the shakers and the cleaned mud flows 
back to the pits before the process is repeated (Figure 2). In conventional drilling, this 
circulation is an open system in which mud returns to atmospheric pressure from an 
open annulus. During connections of new drillpipes, the mud pumps are stopped and 
circulation is held while a new stand of pipe is connected (Thorbjørnsen 2009). 
 
Figure 2: Open circulation system. Mud returns to the surface and flows out of the well 
through piping open to atmospheric pressure. There is no back pressure (Rehm 2008).  
 
Functions of Mud 
The main function of mud is to control pressure in the well by offsetting the pressure of 
the formation, also called primary well control. Weighting agents are added to the mud 
to increase its density, and hence, its pressure on the walls of the well. During drilling, 
mud carries cuttings up to surface where it is separated on the shakers. When drilling 
stops, the mud functions as a suspension tool to keep the cuttings from falling to the 
bottom of the hole again. The viscosity of the fluid increases when movement decreases 
allowing the fluid to have a liquid consistency when drilling is occurring and then it 
turns into a more solid substance when drilling stops. This gel-like substance transforms 
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again into liquid when drilling continues. A third important function of mud is to 
provide rock stabilization (Caenn & Chillingar 1996).  
 
Pressure Terms 
As mentioned, one of the primary functions of mud is to control the downhole pressure 
in the wellbore (Skjeggestad 1989). In order to understand how and what is being 
controlled, different pressure terms need to be addressed (Bourgoyne et al. 1991).  
In drilling, hydrostatic pressure is the force exerted by drilling fluid in the wellbore, and 
is maintained by the mud density and the height of the fluid column (1). This term is 
therefore valid when the mud pumps are shut off and hence no circulation. Formation 
pressure is the force exerted by fluids in the formation, and is also called reservoir pore 
pressure. Both fluid in the formation and fluid in the wellbore are under hydrostatic 
pressure, but in most well-control discussions, hydrostatic pressure refers to the pressure 
of the drilling fluid in the wellbore. This hydrostatic pressure can be calculated as such: 
HP = C x MW x TVD                                                                                                     (1) 
Where: 
HP = hydrostatic pressure, psi 
C = constant (value dependent on unit used to express mud weight) 
MW = mud weight, ppg, Specific Gravity or other units 
TVD = true vertical depth, feet or meters  
Differential pressure refers to a difference in pressure between two areas. For example, 
if hydrostatic pressure in the borehole is higher than the pressure in the formation, a 
pressure differential exists between the two. When drilling a well, a higher pressure in 
the wellbore is needed to prevent the wellbore from collapsing and to avoid formation 
fluids to enter. If formation fluid comes into the wellbore, a kick has occurred. If this 
fluid is gas, it will expand on its way upwards the annulus because the hydrostatic 
pressure decreases. If the kick is not detected, it can result in a blow-out (see section 
2.2).    
The fracture pressure is the amount of pressure that would cause a formation to break 
down, or fracture. In a well control context, the fracture pressure of the weakest 
formation exposed to the wellbore must be known as the pressures developed during 
well-control procedures may exceed the fracture pressure of the formation. Should 
fracture pressure be exceeded, the formation fractures and lost circulation can occur. 
Lost circulation will be described in section 2.2.3. The pressure between pore- and 
fracture pressure is known as the drilling window (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Pressure plot. With increasing downhole depth, both the pore pressure and 
fracture pressure increases. In order to drill safely, the pressure within the wellbore must 
be between pore pressure and fracture pressure, also known as the drilling window (Halle 
2010).   
Another pressure concept is pressure losses through the circulation system. Drilling 
fluid exits the mud pumps under high pressure and through the elements illustrated in 
Figure 2. When mud returns to surface from the annulus the original pressure has been 
spent. Each element in the circulation system absorbs energy as the mud rubs against 
the walls and the pipe and equipment causing friction, named friction pressure. In 
general, pressure losses increase when pump speed increases and when mud weight 
increases. In addition, pressure losses are generally higher with thick, viscous mud than 
with thin mud. Friction loss is relevant for the term equivalent circulating pressure 
(ECD), which will be described in the next subsection.  
Fluid set in motion is named hydraulic pressure. When mud is being circulated, the 
bottomhole pressure (BHP) equals the hydrostatic pressure plus the pressure required to 
move mud up the annulus. Annular pressure exists only when mud is being circulated, 
and it is caused by the friction that resists the flow of fluid up the annulus. Another way 
to look at the BHP increase caused by friction losses in the annulus is in terms of ECD. 
ECD is a combination of the original mud weight plus the equivalent mud weight 
increase due to pressure loss, or friction. The ECD is an important parameter during 
drilling as an undesired increase or decrease in ECD could lead to loss of well control. 
An increase in ECD could mean poor hole cleaning with cuttings buildup in the well 
due to unsatisfied mud properties, whereas a decrease could be caused by flow from the 
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wellbore into the formation. In order to maintain well control, it is important that the 
ECD of the mud is within this window at all times. 
 
2.1.2 Managed Pressure Drilling 
MPD is a general description of methods for managing wellbore pressure in challenging 
wells that cannot be drilled by conventional methods. In addition to the traditional mud 
weight and friction pressure, MPD introduces another variable for primary well control; 
applied pressure from surface (2) and (3). The mud weight can then apply a pressure 
similar to the pore pressure while an overbalance is kept by the additional backpressure. 
In formation zones where pore and fracture pressure can constantly change, or the 
drilling window is narrow, the wellbore pressure can be altered accordingly. The 
formula for BHP while circulating and at static conditions are, respectively (Saeed et al. 
2012): 
BHP = Hydrostatic pressure (MW) + frictional pressure (ECD) + backpressure          (2) 
 
BHP = Hydrostatic pressure (MW) + backpressure                                                       (3)     
 
The International Association of Drilling Contractors defines MPD as  (IADC 2012): 
 ―An adaptive drilling process used to precisely control the annular pressure profile 
throughout the wellbore. The objectives are to ascertain the downhole pressure 
environment limits and to manage the annular hydraulic pressure profile accordingly. It 
is the intention of MPD to avoid continuous influx of formation fluids to the surface. 
Any influx incidental to the operation will be safely contained using an appropriate 
process.  
- MPD process employs a collection of tools and techniques which may mitigate 
the risks and costs associated with drilling wells that have narrow downhole 
environmental limits, by proactively managing the annular hydraulic pressure 
profile. 
 
- MPD may include control of backpressure, fluid density, fluid rheology, annular 
fluid level, circulating friction, and hole geometry. 
 
- MPD may enable faster corrective action to deal with observed pressure 
variations. The ability to dynamically control annular pressures facilitates 
drilling of what might otherwise be economically unattainable prospects.” 
This definition is general for methods that manipulate the wellbore pressure. Further, 
IADC has agreed upon four variations of MPD, which is Constant Bottom Hole 
Pressure (CBHP), Mud Cap Drilling, Dual Gradient, and Return Flow Control. Often, a 
combination of these methods is used (Hannegan 2011; Rohani 2012). In this thesis, 
Halliburton’s MPD system is used as a case. This is a CBHP system, and will therefore 
have a further focus. 
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Constant Bottom Hole Pressure 
CBHP refers to a process where the annular pressure in the well is held constant or near 
constant at a specific depth. In this context constant means maintaining BHP within a 
window bounded by an upper fracture and lower pore pressure limit. This is 
accomplished by placing a rotary control device (RCD) above the BOP which seals off 
the annulus. Instead of mud flow going to open atmosphere as in conventional drilling, 
mud is led to an automatic choke manifold. The opening of the choke can be adjusted to 
regulate the backpressure to ensure desired BHP (Rehm & Paknejad 2008). When the 
mud pumps are shut off, an additional pump is used to circulate mud through the choke 
to create a backpressure. The purpose of using the backpressure pump while circulation 
is to prevent pressure spikes due to change in ECD when stopping and starting the mud 
pumps. As pressure is applied to the annulus, a float-valve is installed inside the 
bottomhole assembly (BHA) to prevent backflow through the drillstring (Florence et al. 
2013). Iversen et al. (2006) has demonstrated the feasibility of MPD with automatic 
choke control in a depleted reservoir field.  
In other words, MPD replaces the pressure exerted by static mud weight with dynamic 
friction pressure to maintain control of the well. A challenge with this method is to 
coordinate the gradually up and down ramping of the mud pumps and backpressure 
pump while simultaneously closing the surface choke (Figure 4). A carefully designed 
pump and choke operating schedule and good cooperation between the pump and choke 
operators is needed (Rehm & Paknejad 2008). Operations that may result in fluctuations 
of BHP are connections, sending downlink, and movement of pipe up and downwards 
causing swabbing and surging (Breyholtz et al. 2009). 
 
Advantages by using MPD  
The primary advantages of MPD is to reduce drilling costs due to nonproductive time 
(NPT) while increasing safety with specialized techniques and surface equipment 
(Rehm & Paknejad 2008). From a risk perspective, the main advantage of using MPD is 
to improve control of the BHP with intuitively enhanced well control (Handal et al. 
2013). With real-time measurements of well parameters and the possibility to 
continuously adjust the pressure downhole, the method facilitates ―walking the line‖ 
with the pore pressure. Also, the fluid mud flow is more accurately measured compared 
with conventional methods (Hannegan 2009). This gives an enhanced primary well 
control.  Other advantages are found in the table below (Table 1): 
Table 1: Advantages found by utilizing Managed Pressure Drilling (Rehm & Paknejad 
2008). 
Description Advantages 
Extending casing 
points 
Casing point can be extended beyond the normal pore pressure of 
fracture pressure gradient limit to reduce the number of casing strings 
required. This allows the target to be reached with a larger hole diameter 
for production. 
Lost circulation Maintaining the mud density below the fracture pressure and using a 
variable annular back pressure at the surface enable the operator to 
maintain the wellbore pressure within drilling window. 
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Well kicks MPD seeks to avoid the problem of well kicks by carefully monitoring 
the ECD in the hole and controlling inflow and outflow or pressure 
changes in the wellbore with impressed surface pressure.  
Differential stuck 
drill pipe 
Often a well kick initiates or is the result of pipe sticking. Differential 
sticking is caused by the difference in pressure between the wellbore and 
a permeable zone, causing the pipe to be stuck against the wall. Keeping 
a lower differential pressure between the wellbore and the formation 
reduces sticking tendencies.  
Deepwater 
drilling  
 
In deep waters, upper layers of the subsurface often have the fracture 
strength close to the hydrostatic pressure of seawater. The small margin 
between the pore pressure and the formation strength dictates that 
multiple casing strings often have to be set. The long column of drilling 
fluid in the riser can be given the density to control this challenge. 
 
Pressure Control Equipment 
Every supplier of MPD systems offers a unique version to the costumer; however, the 
principles are the same. To facilitate a way to evaluate the systems role in ensuring 
primary well control, Handal et al. (2013) have suggested a generic description of an 
MPD pressure control system. The system is decomposed into subsystems and 
components, in addition to functions and sub functions (Table 2). A simplified version 
will be given here, while a generic MPD system is demonstrated in Figure 4: 
Table 2: Generic description of MPD pressure control equipment (Handal et al. 2013). 
1. MPD control system used to maintain BHP within operational pressure window. 
 Logic unit used to perform arithmetic and logical operations. 
o Controller used to control dynamic MPD pressure control equipment 
like choke and pumps. 
o Mechanistic models used to simulate other operational parameters. 
 Well monitoring system used to monitor operational parameters and gives input 
to MPD control system. Different measuring devices used to monitor well, and 
dynamic and static MPD pressure control equipment, e.g.: 
o Flowmeters measuring mud return flow through mud return lines, and 
MPD choke manifold. 
o Pressure transmitters positioned close to dynamic or passive MPD 
pressure control equipment. 
o Temperature transmitters. 
o Other relevant measurements. 
2. Dynamic MPD pressure control equipment used to dynamically adapt the annular 
hydraulic pressure profile could be, but are not limited to: 
 Automated MPD choke manifold used to regulate annular hydraulic 
backpressure and mud return flow. Adjustable chokes.  
 Conventional pumps used to circulate fluid or cement. 
o Rig pumps 
o Cement unit 
 Additional circulating systems connected to the well. 
o Backpressure pump used to maintain flow through MPD choke 
manifold. 
 Dedicated valves or tools used to restrict flow in drillstring or in well. 
3. Static MPD pressure control equipment used to isolate back pressure: 
Rotating Control Device (RCD) used to close well system and maintain backpressure. 
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Figure 4: Decomposition of a generic MPD system, presenting the hierarchy of equipment 
for managing flow and pressure. MPD pressure control equipment can be broken down 
into: the MPD controller unit with its monitoring system, the dynamic MPD pressure 
control equipment, and the static MPD pressure control system. Adapted from (Handal et 
al. 2013).   
 
2.1.3 Halliburton Geobalance MPD 
Halliburton is one of the leading suppliers of MPD system solutions on today’s market. 
Their CBHP system has been used to drill successfully on the Kvitebjørn field on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (Tonnessen et al. 2006). Kvitebjørn is located in the 
Northern North Sea, and is classified as a High Temperature High Pressure (HTHP) gas 
field. Nine wells had been drilled into the reservoir prior to introducing the MPD 
technique. On the last conventionally drilled well, massive losses were experienced. 
Drilling was therefore suspended before reaching TD due to the well control situation 
created by these mud losses. No further drilling on Kvitebjørn was possible until MPD 
was introduced to operate within the reduced drilling window of the reservoir (Mosti & 
Flatebo 2008). Other technologies were selected to support MPD, however, these will 
not be presented in this thesis. The following is an introduction to Halliburton’s MPD 
system, CBHP, which is called GeoBalance (Halliburton). 
Choke Manifold 
GeoBalance MPD Choke is the main tool for controlling the surface pressure and 
thereby accurately controlling the BHP on MPD operations. The hydraulic chokes are 
automatically controlled to keep a desired surface pressure from an advanced hydraulic 
model, based on the measurement readings. The unit’s choke manifold with dual chokes 
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is configured such that each of the chokes act as redundancy for the other in case the it 
is plugged or washed out. A bypass line is incorporated, which also has dual block 
valves. Data is recoded in the INSITE Data Acquisition System (DAS) system (figure 
5), for use in the GeoBalance control system. The control system software utilizes Data 
Validation Software, which verifies the integrity of transducers, flow meter, MPD 
system data, and third party acquisition system interfaces.  
 
Figure 5: Display of the Geobalance MPD Control System (Halliburton). The system is set 
to drilling, and the display is illustrating different pressures, depths, flows, and rig data.  
 
Rotating Control Device  
The rotating control device (RCD) is a key piece of well control equipment by diverting 
flow from the annulus to the MPD choke manifold.  
 
Backpressure Pump 
Backpressure Pump (BPP) is situated upstream to the return line of the choke manifold. 
The pump maintains pressure in the well by pumping fluid into the annulus when 
needed, for instance during connection of new drillpipes. The advantage of using a BPP 
with variable speed drive is that the ramping of flow can be configured such that the 
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total flow rate change through the choke is kept as smooth as possible. The rate of 
change can follow a predefined ramp, both for starting and stopping the pump. 
Starting/stopping the flow from the BBP is possible on command from an operator in 
the human-machine interface, or triggered by lowering/rising flow from rig pumps. The 
pre-scheduled ramp up or down can be interrupted and stopped at any time by the MPD 
system. The pump can be controlled either remotely or locally in the field with the 
control display on the pump skid (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Inputs of automatic ramping schedule for the backpressure pump (with 
permission from Halliburton AS).  
An alternative to use a backpressure pump, is to use a Rig Pump Diverter (RPD). 
Instead of turning mud pumps off and starting a backpressure pump, RPD diverts flow 
from existing rig pumps away from stand pipe into the MPD flowline and across the 
automated choke. This will provide continuous non-interrupted flow during multiple 
operations. This automated approach is key to precise BHP during these operations.  
 
Flowmeter 
The Flow Metering Unit downstream of the choke unit measures the total returned fluid 
flow rate, temperature and density of the well. It is a standalone unit and uses a single 
phase Coriolis flowmeter which sits upstream of the BPP. The Coriolis meter has a 
flowrate measurement range of 0 to 1500 liters per minute (lpm). The flow rate, density, 
and temperature data is recorded by the DAS system, and forms an integral part of the 
control automation of the MPD system (Figure 7). Fluid flow rate out data is correlated 
to injected drilling mud rate from the rig mud pumps and the BPP.  
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Figure 7: Demonstration of an increase in flow which could be an indication of a kick 
(with permission from Halliburton AS).  
 
Control Cabin 
The control cabin functions as an MPD operations Command Center, and houses the 
Autochoke Control Systems and Insite Data Acquisition System (DAS) (Figure 8). The 
aim of the MPD Control System and Insite DAS system is to provide the dynamic 
hydraulic model which is required for automated control of the BHP. Third party rig 
data, mud loggers, and Measurements While Drilling (MWD) systems data can be tied 
into the MPD Insite DAS system, so all relevant circulating system data is available real 
time to the driller, client and MPD crew. Also, an Insite DAS display is installed in the 
rig floor dog house. This allows the driller to monitor the MPD system data while 
drilling (Figure 8).   
The inner control loop of the Command center consists of the controller and the choke. 
The controller system is composed of a number of functional blocks which are usually 
implemented in a dedicated computer known as a PLC. A PLC is an industrial computer 
used for automation of many industrial processes. This is an example of a real-time 
system because output results must be produced in response to input conditions. The 
PLC’s primary functions are to monitor, control, and communicate. It monitors data 
from sensors. It controls chokes and valves using a chosen control algorithm. Moreover, 
it acts as a conduit or translator to transfer (or communicate) information between 
equipment and software. 
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Figure 8: An example of a control cabin for MPD operation (with permission from 
Halliburton AS). 
Training for the personnel that are part of the MPD operation offshore is not looked 
upon in this thesis. However, this has been the focus on a previous master thesis 
(Lorentsen 2012) which uses Halliburton’s MPD setup in a implemented, full scale 
drilling simulator developed by Statoil and cooperating partners; SINTEF, eDrilling, 
and Oiltec Solutions. The simulator has an MPD module which simulation of well 
control challenges (Statoilasa 2012).   
 
2.2 Safety 
2.2.1 Well Control 
Well control is to maintaining the fluid column hydrostatic pressure to prevent influx of 
formation fluids into the wellbore. This is achieved through safety barriers. In general, 
barriers are measures that reduce the probability of releasing a hazard with potential for 
harm and reduce its consequences (Figure 9) (Rausand 2013). PSA defines barriers as 
―Technical, operational and organizational elements which are intended individually or 
collectively to reduce possibility/ for a specific error, hazard or accident to occur, or 
which limit its harm/disadvantages‖. An explanation on the definition can be found in 
PSA (2013b).   
Different regulations mention requirements for well barriers in the petroleum industry, 
such as The Facilities Regulations, The Management Regulations, and the Activities 
Regulations (Lovdata) in addition to NORSOK Standard D-010. In summary, they state 
that two barriers are required when drilling in hydrocarbon bearing formations or 
abnormal pressure formation. In addition, there shall be sufficient independence 
between the barriers. This relationship of two independent barriers can be illustrated in a 
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Bow Tie diagram (Figure 9). When adapting the figure to drilling; the hazard is the 
formation pore pressure and hydrocarbons, while preventive barriers are primary well 
control/well barrier. The hazardous event is a well kick, and mitigating barrier is the 
secondary well barrier/well control. The consequence is a blowout. For conventional 
drilling, the primary well barrier is ensured by the mud column in the well, or the 
hydrostatic pressure in the annulus. If the primary barrier fails, the blowout-preventer 
system with additional barrier equipment e.g. wellhead, casing strings, casing cement, 
and casing packers is the secondary barrier. 
 
Figure 9: The Bow Tie Model. Safety barriers are introduced to prevent major accidents 
from happening, and to mitigate the consequences when they do occur Hazard could be 
pressure from the formation, hazardous event could be well kick influx and consequences 
could be a blowout. Primary barrier is the mud while secondary barrier is the blowout 
preventer with other components. Adapted from (Rausand 2013). 
In 2013, The NORSOK Standards D-010 was revised (Rev 4) (D-010 2013) with a 
chapter including MPD. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the establishment of 
well barriers by the use of well barrier elements, and additional requirements and 
guidelines to execute MPD operations in a safe manner. Here, the primary well barrier 
in MPD operations is described to be maintained by a statically underbalanced fluid 
column with applied surface pressure. The BHP is controlled by means of a closed loop 
surface system and equipment providing backpressure. The secondary well barrier for 
MPD is the same as for conventional drilling. However, sufficient independence 
between barriers is struggling to be fulfilled (pers.com. Sondre Øie, DNV GL). More on 
well barriers in MPD operations can be found in Grebstad (2013).   
 
2.2.2 Loss of Well Control 
Mainly two types of situations can cause loss of well control, either a kick can occur or 
a lost circulation (LC) can occur. LC will be described later in this section. As a 
repetition, a kick is an influx of formation fluid such as oil, gas, or water into the 
wellbore from the formation. It occurs when the pressure exerted by the column of 
drilling fluid in the wellbore is lower than the pore pressure. Once a kick happens, the 
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intruded fluid further reduces the hydrostatic pressure of the mud column since 
formation fluid usually is less dense than drilling mud. If a kick is not detected a 
blowout is underway. A blowout is an uncontrolled release of fluid from the wellbore 
after pressure control systems have failed (Baker & Fitzpatrick 1998). In the table 3, the 
general reasons for loss of well control are listed: 
Table 3: Causes that could lead to loss of well control during drilling (Baker & Fitzpatrick 
1998).  
Reason for loss of 
well control 
Description 
Insufficient mud 
weight 
 
During conventional drilling, the weight of the mud is the primary 
means of controlling a well. If the mud weight develops less pressure 
than formation pore pressure, the well is underbalanced and fluid 
from a permeable formation can enter the wellbore. On the other 
hand, an overbalanced condition, in which mud weight develops more 
pressure than formation pressure can create problems such as fracture 
of weak formations. Mud weight can unintentionally be decreased by 
adding water to the system, or weight materials can settle out of the 
mud. Temperature affects the mud’s density, in which a higher 
temperature makes mud less dense. 
Swabbing Swabbing is caused by drillstring dragging along mud as the string is 
pulled out of the hole. The likelihood of swabbing is increased by 
pulling the pipe too fast, using mud with high viscosity and gel-
strength, having a thick plugged drillstring, and having small 
clearance between the string and the hole. Most swabbing occurs 
when the bit is first moved off bottom.  
Surging 
 
Surging is the increase in borehole pressure caused by downward 
movement of the drill string. The tendency of mud to adhere to drill 
pipe and to the wall of the hole creates friction as the pipe is moved 
downwards. Pressure on the wellbore caused by surging can lead to 
lost circulation. To minimize surging, pipe must be run into hole 
slowly, keep the mud in the system in good condition, and break 
circulation periodically while tripping. 
Failure to keep the 
hole full of fluid 
 
When the drillstring is pulled from the hole, the fluid level drops 
because of the volume of steel being removed and the drop of mud 
level reduces hydrostatic pressure. To prevent hydrostatic pressure 
from dropping as pipe is pulled, the volume of steel and mud 
removed need to be replaced with fluid. If the hole takes less fluid 
than calculated, an influx from the formation to the wellbore has 
occurred. Another cause failure to keep the hole full of fluid is during 
a lost circulation situation. The drop in fluid level due to lost 
circulation can cause the BHP to decrease below the level required to 
balance the pore pressure, resulting in a kick.  
 
Detection of Kicks 
The signs for detecting a kick are fairly simple and should be known by all personnel in 
the field. Usually, a combination of many signals is present at the same time when a 
kick has occurred (table 4) (Baker & Fitzpatrick 1998).  
Theory 
19 
 
Table 4: Some of the signs that may indicate that the well has made a kick (Halle 2010). 
Kick signals Description 
Well flow with pumps 
shut down 
Mud returns to surface even though the pumps are shut off. This can 
be observed in the flowline.   
Sudden increase in 
mud returning to the 
surface 
If the well kicks, the flow rate of the mud returning from the hole 
increases as the kick fluid pushes the mud upwards. This can be 
detected from flow-measurement devices.  
Change in flow into 
the well versus flow 
out of the well 
 
Monitoring the volume of flow going into the well and volume flow 
going out of the well can reveal a possible kick. This volume should 
at all-time be the same, however, if the volume changes a kick may 
have occurred.  
Sudden increase in 
drilling rate 
 
Usually, when the bit enters an overpressured formation, the rate of 
penetration increases. The ROP is also dependent on how well the 
mud cleans the hole, bit weight, mud fluid’s properties and drilling 
through new type formation, so the increase may not be a sign for a 
kick.  
Standpipe pressure 
drop 
A kick will help mud flow to the surface, hence, the standpipe 
pressure drops.  
Increased torque 
 
Torque increases with depth in normal pressured zones but shows a 
greater increase in a transition zone where formation pressures are 
becoming abnormal. In transition zones, large amounts of shale 
cuttings can enter the wellbore and impede drillstring rotation.  
Increased drag 
 
If formation pressure is greater than hydrostatic pressure during the 
time circulation is stopped for connection or trip, the formation may 
close in around the drill pipe. This closing in causes the pipe to drag 
as it is moved. If the pipe is off bottom, the formation may slough or 
cave into the hole, preventing the bit from returning to its previous 
depth because of hole fill-up.   
Gas-cut mud 
 
Gas-cut mud can occur when gas-bearing formation is drilled or gas 
gets into the mud from the rock that is destroyed by the bit. During 
tripping or connections, the friction pressure is lost and gas in the 
mud could cause a large difference in the BHP causing a kick.   
Mud pit volume 
change 
 
A pit gain is a sure sign that fluid in the hole is being displaced by 
formation fluid entering the well. A pit loss could mean a lost 
circulation situation. Many factor can increase or decrease pit 
volume measured by sensors, like rig movement, leakage of water 
or losing mud over the shakers.  
Other signs Change in cuttings size and volume, increase in salinity or chlorides 
in the drilling fluid due to salinity of the formation water, or 
indications from well logging data.  
Kick develops into a blowout for one or more of the following reasons (Baker & 
Fitzpatrick 1998): 
- Lack of early detection 
- Failure to take proper initial action 
- Lack of adequate control equipment 
- Malfunction of control equipment 
- Incorrect kill procedure 
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Regain Well Control after Kick Detection 
In conventional well control procedures, the first response after detecting a kick is to do 
a flowcheck. The pumps are stopped and the well is monitored to see if it flows. If 
necessary, the well is isolated by closing a valve on the BOP. By shutting down the mud 
pumps the frictional pressure is removed which decreases the BHP. This will most 
probably increase the influx of formation fluid if a kick has happened. However, 
because the BOP is closed, the pressure will start to increase again as more fluids enter 
the well until the downhole pressure balances the formation pressure. When the well is 
in balance, the subsequent action process is to kill the well. The most common 
procedure is referred to as the driller’s method. The short explanation is that the 
formation fluid is carefully circulated out of the wellbore, and then the original light 
mud is replaced by a heavier mud (Devereux 2012).  
The MPD system can be configured to detect kicks by monitoring flow-in and flow-out. 
In a more responsive kick detection method, the system continuously monitors average 
annulus fluid density by comparing the real-time hydraulic model to actual BHP 
measurements. If a kick occurs, the model will detect the reduction in the average 
density, and produce an alarm. Because the system is designed to maintain the BHP 
constant, it will close the choke in, an effort to offset the previously recorded density. 
This limits influx by maintaining what is a constant drawdown on the reservoir and 
prevents hole unloading as would be the case if a kick was not detected. Once a kick is 
detected, the standard procedure is to shut the well in and allow the pressure to build up 
to prevent further influx and determine reservoir pressure. The operator can then choose 
to let the system automatically circulate out the kick of the well (Fredericks et al. 2006), 
or use the conventional driller’s method described earlier (pers.com. Tim Tønnesen, 
MPD Manager, Halliburton AS).  
 
2.2.3 Lost Circulation 
Loss of circulation (LC) is the uncontrolled flow of whole mud into a formation due to 
pressure in the well being above the fracture pressure. The losses can be total which 
means that no fluid is returning to surface. Partial lost circulation means that mud 
continues to flow to surface with some losses to the formation. LC may occur due to 
formations that are inherently fractured, cavernous, or with high permeability. Other 
reasons may be improper drilling conditions, or induced fractures caused by excessive 
downhole pressure. (Halle 2010).  
The complete prevention of lost circulation is impossible, because some formations, 
such as fractured, cavernous, or high-permeability zones, are not avoidable if the target 
zone is to be reached. However, limiting circulation loss is possible if certain 
precautions are taken, especially those related to induced fractures. These precautions 
are to maintain proper mud weight, minimizing annular-friction pressure losses during 
drilling and tripping, and have adequate hole cleaning. Setting casing to protect upper 
weaker formations and updating formation pore pressure and fracture gradient for better 
accuracy with log data may also be precautions.    
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Indications of losses are decreasing drillpipe pressures casing pressures, or decreasing 
pit volume. If lost circulation zones are anticipated, preventive measures should be 
taken by treating the mud with lost circulation materials (LCMs) which are course 
materials aiming in sealing off downhole fractures. In addition, preventive tests such as 
the Leakoff test and formation integrity test should be performed to limit the possibility 
of loss of circulation. Description of these methods can be found in Baker & Fitzpatrick 
(1998). One of the major concerns during LC is if a failure of keeping the hole filled 
with mud results in a kick. The next subsection will explain a situation with losses to the 
formation.  
 
The Incident at Gullfaks C 
On May 19
th
 2010, an incident on Gullfaks C, Well 34/10-C-06 AT5 occurred. The well 
was drilled with MPD to a total depth of 4800 meters. During the final circulation and 
hole cleaning of the reservoir section, a hole appeared in the 13 3/8‖ casing with 
subsequent loss of mud to the formation. The casing was a common well barrier 
element, and thus the hole in the casing implied loss of both well barriers. Loss of 
backpressure lead to influx from the exposed reservoir into the well until solids or 
cuttings packed off the well by the 9 5/8‖ liner shoe. The pack-off limited further influx 
of hydrocarbons into the well. Both the crew on the platform and the onshore 
organization struggled to understand and handle the complex situation during the first 
twenty-four hours. The well control operation continued for almost two months before 
the well barriers were reinstated. The incident did not involve any damage on humans, 
any spillage or fire/explosion. 
Statoil’s investigation report found that the hole in the 13 3/8‖ casing was caused by 
insufficient technical integrity of the casing. Another cause was lack of monitoring and 
follow- up of the pressure in the annulus behind the casing. A cause contributing to the 
difficulties related to handling the well control situation was that the MPD operation 
was started and carried out with insufficient margin between the pore and fracture 
pressure. They also found an insufficient risk assessment related to application of the 13 
3/8‖ casing as a common well barrier. Moreover, the risk evaluation during the 
execution of the MPD operation and transfer of experience related to pressure control 
from another MPD operation was insufficient. Other causes were related to insufficient 
planning of the operations, knowledge to and compliance with requirements, MPD 
knowledge, and involvement of the company’s technical expertise. While MPD has the 
potential of providing increased well control, the introduction of new technology also 
adds complexity and unknown risks. This implication was one of the findings in an 
investigation (Statoil 2010).  
 
2.3 Human Performance  
The nature of the work in industrialized societies has changed since the 1950s, from 
being manual to mostly cognitive – or work with the mind. Thus, human functions are 
partly being replaced by machines in an automatic process, a development which is also 
seen in the oil and gas industry in Norway (Larsen et al. 2010). To assess and improve 
interactions between man and machine, Human Factor (HF) methods with various 
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scientific disciplines from sociology, psychology, physiology, health, working 
environment and engineering, may be used. One of the objectives for human factor 
methods is to review human performance which is the accomplishment of tasks in 
accordance with agreed upon standards of accuracy, completeness, and efficiency 
(Stranks 2007). Within the field of automation, many aspects of human performance 
exist. In this report, the focus will be on human error in relationship to safety and well 
control. Human Factors in the design phase are both mentioned in the ISO-standard, 
ISO 11064, part 1 and in the Petroleum Safety Authorities Norway (Heber & Åsland 
2005).      
 
2.3.1 Automation 
In broad sense, automation is to introduce control system and information technology to 
reduce the physical and/or mental workload of human operators that are in charge of 
running the process. In general, process automation is motivated by a desire to increase 
economic and/or operational performance while making the process as safe as possible. 
In the current drilling industry, humans are usually not replaced by automated systems; 
instead they are acting in a joint human-machine system. The systems are thereby used 
to improve the performance during normal operations while allowing the operator to 
intervene to varying degrees in case of abnormal operation (Breyholtz & Nikolaou 
2012). This can lead to new or changed types of tasks to the operator (Lee & Seppelt 
2009).    
Automation has most extensively been studied in the aviation industry. The reason is the 
last century’s great development within the field, which has simplified some tasks like 
horizontal aviation, but has also led to some fatal accidents. Due to these accidents, ―out 
of the loop‖ performance has received considerable attention, including concern of loss 
of skill, and loss/impairment of situation awareness (Endsley & Kiris 1995). Lessons 
learned from this and other industries should be considered when introducing more 
automation in drilling operations (Thorogood et al. 2010).  
 
Mode of Automation 
As a general term, automation is referring to a variety of automation strategies with 
different modes of human-machine interactions. The role of both the human operator 
and the automation system will be affected by the chosen automation strategy. Today’s 
mode of automation in the drilling industry is low, but increasing. Based on the aviation 
industry, six different strategies have been described, (Breyholtz & Nikolaou 2012) in 
which mode 0 has the lowest degree of automation, and mode 6 has the highest mode of 
automation (Billings 1997; Parasuraman et al. 2000). From Table 5, MPD has a mode 3 
Management by Delegation, where some tasks are delegated to the automated system by 
a closed loop controller while other tasks are performed manually. Alternative modes of 
automation can be found in Thorogood et al. (2010). 
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Table 5 Different modes of automation adapted from the aviation industry (Billings 1997).  
Mode Management 
Mode 
Automation Functions Drillers Functions 
6 Autonomous 
Operation 
Fully autonomous operation No particular function. Monitoring 
is limited to fault detection. 
5 Management 
by Exception 
The automation system 
chooses operation and 
defines operational goals. 
Informs the driller on critical 
decision. 
The driller is informed of the 
system’s intent. Must consent to 
critical decisions. May intervene by 
reverting to lower mode of 
management. 
4 Management 
by Consent 
The automation provides 
coordinated control of 
multiple control loops. 
The driller feeds the automation 
system with a chosen operation and 
operation goals. 
3 Management 
by Delegation 
The automation system 
provides closed loop control 
of individual tasks. (E.g. 
Choke pressure control in an 
MPD system; automated 
tripping module). 
The driller decides setpoints for the 
individual control loop (E.g. 
pressure in MPD operations) Some 
tasks still performed manually 
(envelope protection active). 
2 Shared control The automation system could 
interfere to prevent the driller 
from exceeding specified 
boundaries. 
Envelope protection systems are 
enabled. Decision support/advisory 
systems are available. 
1 Assisted 
Manual 
Control 
Provides downhole 
information trends and 
detects abnormal conditions. 
Does not intervene. 
The driller has direct authority over 
all systems. Decision-making is 
computer-aided. 
0 Direct Manual 
Control 
Normal warnings and alarms. 
System does not have any 
direct authority. 
The driller has direct authority over 
all systems.  
 
A manual takeover during drilling is likely to be motivated by an abnormal situation, 
and usually requires both skills and experience to recognize the reason and how to bring 
the well/system back to normal operational condition. The time available to do both 
tasks is most likely limited, and an important task is to know when to take appropriate 
measures. Drillers with experience from manual operations would have a more intuitive 
understanding of when this is needed than those without experience. (Breyholtz & 
Nikolaou 2012). From the aviation industry, Metzger & Parasuraman (2001) found that 
high traffic density and a passive controller degrades conflict detection performance. 
They recommend keeping the controller in authority.  
It is worth pointing out that mode has two meaning in this thesis. Mode could refer to 
automatic or manual mode, or mode could refer to level of mode as described in Table 
5. 
 
How is Automation achieved?  
MPD comes in a number of different varieties of automation influence. The segment 
that primarily has been developed for automation is to control BHP by applied 
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backpressure and a choke device, which can both be fully or partly automated (Figure 
10). This workflow lends naturally well to automated philosophy (Saeed et al. 2012). 
The rotating control device is not directly involved in the automations, but is essential in 
forming a closed loop system by dynamically sealing off the annulus and diverting all 
return flow to a designated choke. Most suppliers prefer to use a feedback loop in which 
sensors are installed to monitor controlled variables. Values from signals received are 
transmitted to a feedback control system, where a specialized controller makes 
automatic determinations of deviation between desired values and actual values. The 
controller then calculates appropriate signals that reflect the BHP, and these are 
automatically transmitted to the control devices (choke). The choke will adjust to 
whether a higher or lower pressure in the well is needed.  
 
Figure 10: The HMI is displaying as much information as possible to keep high focus on 
the critical information needed in the present situation. The figure suggests the main 
window when the system is in Automatic mode (with permission from Halliburton AS).  
To enable easy user interaction and supervision, a mechanism is required for accepting 
and processing user instructions and commands. This requirement is fulfilled by a 
human-machine interface (HMI). The interface is implemented to provide a convenient 
centralized control panel (or dashboard) to the entire system. This has to be done in an 
effective and efficient, but also simple, intuitive, and user friendly way. The interface 
provides both display of acquired and calculated information, and also interactive 
control elements in one unified location. This is vital, as it enables operators to control 
all aspects of the operation, from selecting computation algorithms that performs 
advanced hydraulic computation, controlling valves and chokes, to setting levels of 
automation (Saeed et al. 2012). 
In the HMI described, the driller or MPD operator should be able to move between 
different modes of automation during a single drilling operation, and he should be in 
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absolute authority of the operation even though a high mode of automation is used. This 
means that the operator must be given the means to override the automation if necessary 
(Breyholtz & Nikolaou 2012). The mode of automation for today’s situation might not 
always be the case for future systems,  and since the work distribution between the 
automation system and the driller changes for each increased mode of automation, a 
clear understanding of human-machine interaction is needed (Breyholtz & Nikolaou 
2012). 
 
Drillers’ Role 
During a drilling operation, the driller must maintain control of the well, lead and 
communicate the work on the drill floor, and deal with technically advanced, screen-
based solutions in the drilling cabin (Figure 11). It may thus be challenging to 
understand, operate and maintain an overview of all the incoming data - and 
simultaneously maintain control and overview of what is physically taking place on the 
drill floor (PSA 2013a).  
 
Figure 11: Driller’s cabin during conventional drilling operation. Private picture.  
MPD has an inherent closed loop setup, coupled with conventional methodology. This 
translates to the driller performing the drilling operation while monitoring an extra MPD 
screen. The driller is not responsible for control of the MPD system, which is a task 
performed by MPD operators (Figure 10). However, the driller still has the overall 
responsibility of the operation and the secondary well control if the primary barrier fails. 
One of the reasons why a fully automated MPD system does not exist on the market 
today is the unpredictable nature of drilling operations, in which it is difficult to foresee 
all scenarios (Saeed et al. 2012). The communication strategy during drilling is 
illustrated in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Communication structure during drilling operation.  
 
Team Performance in Complex Systems 
Advances in information technology have allowed development of increasingly 
sophisticated systems for command and control. With this sophistication has come 
increased complexity for operators. Decision making in such complex systems are often 
characterizes by: 1) typically incomplete, uncertain, and ambiguous information, 2) 
typically multiperson teams; thus, overall performance depends on more than just 
individual performance, and 3) members of teams have differing roles and 
responsibilities; consequently communication and coordination are central issues.  
Accidents in complex systems, such as The Three Mile Island (Le Bot 2004), are 
viewed as illustrations of what Perrow terms‖ normal accidents, with complex, tightly 
coupled, with catastrophically potential (Perrow 1984).   
Team-related phenomena often appear to be common across accidents such as the Three 
Mile Island. Problems associated with teams identified are lack of clearly, and 
appropriately, delineated roles, lack of explicit coordination, and communication 
difficulties. Difficulties of roles, coordination, and communication can be caused by a 
variety of contributing factors. It is quite possible for advanced technology, especially 
automation, to move against team performance, by for example isolating team members 
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from each other. While there are numerous concepts of available group decision support 
(Fracker 1988), the notion ―team-centered‖ design of such technologies has not equally 
emerged. Rouse et al. (1992) present a view that team performance should be enhanced 
to extent that team members hold shared or common mental models of the tasks and 
team. Further, the article argues that the effectiveness of most complex systems depends 
to a great extent, on the ability of the team of individuals to coordinate action, integrate 
information and resources and adapt to changing task demands.  
 
2.3.2 Human-Machine Interactions  
Human-machine interaction is the study of interaction between people and computers 
(Preece et al. 1994). This interaction can be input provided from the operator to the 
machine. The machine acts on the input and displays information back to the operator 
regarding its status and the consequences of input. The operator evaluates the 
information and decides which controlling actions are needed, and further provides new 
inputs to the machine (Figure 13). A need of research on human-machine interactions in 
a risk management perspective has been documented by Rasmussen (1997). Different 
factors have been suggested to affect this interaction between the human and machine. 
Some of these will be commented in the following paragraphs.  
 
  
Figure 13: Human-machine interaction (Salvendy 2012). 
 
Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) is the perception of elements in the environment, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future 
(Parasuraman et al. 2008). In dynamic environments, many decisions are required 
across a short time frame, and tasks are dependent upon an ongoing, up-to-date analysis 
of the environment. Since the state of the environment is constantly changing, often in a 
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complex way, a major portion of the operator’s task becomes to obtain and maintain 
upright SA. A lack of SA has been hypothesized to underlie the out of the loop 
decrement that can accompany automation. Operators who have lost SA may be slower 
to detect problems and will also require extra time to reorient themselves in order to 
proceed with problem diagnosis and assumptions of performance when automation 
fails. This might occur for a number of reasons: (a) a loss of vigilance and increase in 
complacency associated with the assumptions of a monitoring role under automation, 
(b) the difference between being an active processor of information in manual 
processing and a passive recipient of information under automation, (c) a loss or change 
in the type of feedback provided to operators concerning the state of the system under 
operation (Endsley 1995).  
It has been hypothesized that keeping humans involved in system operations, may 
provide better performance and SA than that found with highly automated systems, thus 
minimizing the out of the loop performance problem (Endsley & Kiris 1995). Further, 
Endsley (1999) discuss that irrespective of the capabilities of the human and computer 
components, when a human operator must take control in the event of an automation 
failure, he is affected by the level of automation that was operated under prior to failure. 
A higher degree of automation makes it more demanding to manually take control. 
Another finding in the same article is an improved performance under normal operation 
conditions due to automation, while it may be compromised following an automation 
failure due to lack of SA of the automated system.  
 
Trust, Reliance, Communication, and Workload 
Today, trust is seen as a key concern in relation to automation (Lee & See 2004; 
Parasuraman & Riley 1997). Instead of monitoring the automated system, attention may 
be allocated to other manual tasks (Parasuraman et al. 2008). This is also the case when 
it comes to reliability. If the automated system rarely makes mistakes, a possibility 
exists that when it fails, the operator will not detect the failure due to overreliance 
(Sheridan & Parasuraman 2005). Metzger & Parasuraman (2005) demonstrates that a 
conflict is better detected under manual conditions than under automated conditions 
when the automation is imperfect. Understandable communication between the system 
and the operator is important in order to detect a critical situation (Breyholtz & 
Nikolaou 2012). It has been suggested that misunderstandings occur because of a 
mismatch between the mental model of the pilot and behaviors of the automated system. 
Several examples of incidents and accidents resulting from these misunderstandings 
have been reported (Billings 1997; Sarter & Woods 1995). Workload is also a central 
aspect when considering the efficiency and safety of automated systems. The effects of 
workload are related to the limitations of humans to be attentive to several tasks 
simultaneously , and come into play when operators have to relocate mental resources 
away from automation to others tasks that need to be attended to (Gressgård et al. 
2013).  
An example of how important it is to understand changes made by the system is 
provided in the following paragraph. A feedback control system (closed loop) will at all 
times try to compensate for undesirable situations. The operator will not necessarily 
detect such a situation. If influx into the well occurs, the pressure in the well will 
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increase during an initial phase until there is equilibrium between pressure in the 
reservoir and in the well. The response of a low-level automation will be to detect this 
as a deviation from the given set point and the measured value. The closed loop 
algorithm will try to reduce the pressure in the well to compensate for this deviation by 
slightly opening the topside choke to reduce the pressure. This will result in the system 
unintentionally trying to achieve a state of underbalance. If the driller or MPD operator 
is not observant and relies on the automated system, it may take several minutes before 
the condition in the well is detected. The pressure control system has probably made the 
situation worse than it would have been without such a system (Saeed et al. 2012).      
 
2.3.3 Human Error 
While the machines today become more reliable, human errors contribute more to major 
accidents such as Three Mile Island (Le Bot 2004) and Exxon Valdez oil spill accident 
(Harrald et al. 1990). According to literature, humans are error-prone in their decisions, 
especially in complex systems where decisions are made under pressure (Reason 2008). 
Hollnagel (1993) estimates that human errors are involved in 60-90 percentages of the 
incidents in nuclear and oil and gas industries. Errors can be defined as a failure of 
planned actions to achieve a desired goal – without the intervention of some 
unforeseeable event (Reason 1990). In the human error approach, the plan may be 
adequate but the associated action does not go as intended (slips and laps), or the plan is 
inadequate to achieve its intended outcome (mistake).  
Reason (1995) discusses many aspects of human error, and one of his statements is that 
increased automation does not cure the human factor problem; it simply changes its 
nature. Systems become more opaque to their operators. Instead of causing harm by 
slips, lapses, trips and fumbles, people are now more prone to make mistaken judgments 
about the state of the system. In addition to removing localized slips and lapses, 
automation can increase the probability of higher-level mistakes with the capacity to 
cause larger destructions (Reason 2008).  
Literature in the field of supervisory control provides evidence that poor system design 
is responsible for many of the errors, which are incorrectly seen as irresponsible human 
actions (Woods & Cook 1999). Reason (2000), using his Swiss Cheese Model, argues 
that even multiple levels of defences of barriers may be penetrated by an accident 
trajectory. He claims that the holes in the defences arise for two reasons: Active failures, 
which are errors that are committed by people who are directly in contact with the 
system (e.g. slips, lapses, mistakes) and Latent Errors which arise from decisions made 
by designers, builders, and high-level decision makers (Figure 14). Another definition 
of a latent human error could be an error which is likely to be made due to systems or 
routines that are formed in such a way that humans are disposed to making these errors. 
It is important to understand how changes in technology shape human cognition and 
action in order to see how designers can create latent failures. For example, a particular 
technology change may increase the coupling in a system (Perrow 1984), which may 
increase the cognitive demands on the operator. If the system gives weak feedback 
about its state, this can function as a latent failure waiting for the right circumstances 
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and triggering events to lead the system close to an accident (Woods 2010). The 
supervisory control literature provides several prescriptions to remedy errors arisen 
from both active and latent errors. These include minimizing the likelihood of errors by 
carefully designing systems with safeguards and barriers, awareness interfaces, and 
training as well as prescribed ways to tolerate errors (Cummings et al. 2010). However, 
a well-designed system might not always be enough for avoiding errors. The operator 
using the system also needs to understand how it works. 
 
Figure 14: Stages in the development of an organizational accident. Organisational factors 
are not so relevant in this context. Adapted from (Reason 1997). 
 
Mode Confusion 
One important source of errors are mode confusion. Mode confusion occurs when an 
automated system behaves differently than expected, and the operator not being aware 
of, or not properly understanding what the system is doing. As a consequence, mistaken 
judgments may cause human errors. This phenomenon is well recognized in the aviation 
industry and has been specified in a number of high profile aviation accidents. The 
potential for the same type of problems, and associated safety hazards, arise in drilling 
operations as a result of an increasing trend of automation (Iversen et al. 2013). Another 
error may be that the operator takes an action that is appropriate for one mode of the 
device when it is, in fact, in a different mode. Here, the operator could make a wrong 
assessment of the active mode at a particular time or the operator fails to notice 
transitions in mode status. In both cases, the causes can be traced to ―clumsy‖ 
automation. Woods (2010) demonstrates that the complexity of modes, interactions 
across modes and indirect mode changes create new paths for errors and failures. A 
problem may form when two operators are handling the system as it may be difficult to 
maintain awareness about the history of interactions.  
There are several sources of mode confusion which may impact the risk of human error. 
One factor is the operator’s knowledge about the system and how to remember and use 
it when needed (Woods 2010). Another important factor is that an increase in autonomy 
of automation systems is accompanied by an increased delay between the user input and 
feedback about the system behavior. The operator is kept out of the loop from the 
process and activities of the system. This effect may further be strengthened by the fact 
that modes may change based on sensors information concerning the environment and 
system variables. In systems with high levels of autonomy and complexity, there may 
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also be a large number of indicators of the status and behavior of the systems, 
distributed over several displays in different locations. All of these factors increase the 
complexity. As a consequence, it becomes challenging to maintain mode awareness, 
which again increases the potential for failing to detect and recover from errors (Iversen, 
2012).   
In many research studies of mode confusion in a variety of automated control systems, 
Woods (2010) has identified numerous human factor problems that could lead to errors. 
Automation could give an increased demand on the user’s memory, or cause the 
operator to be uncertain as to where he should focus his attention. If many operators are 
working in teams, it could be difficult for them to share the same awareness. 
Automation could also lead to increased stress and workload during high-demand 
periods. Even though automation is supposed to help the human operator, it will also 
demand new knowledge and more difficult judgments. Automation could also limit the 
operator’s ability to develop effective strategies for coping with task demand.  
As humans, we are generally more flexible than technical systems and it is therefore 
difficult to predict the types of error we may commit. A feature that makes us very 
different from technological systems is our ability to detect and recover our own errors 
as well as errors committed by other persons or by technical systems. Bearing that in 
mind, we may claim that human actions contribute to risk, but also to safety. However, 
it is recognized that even well-trained and highly motivated people occasionally make 
errors, and it is necessary to find preventive measures to these. Procedures and training 
may not always be the crucial factor. Some ironies of automation follows  (Bainbridge 
1983; Reason 1997): 
- By taking away the easy parts of human operator’s task, automation can make 
the difficult parts of the job even more difficult. 
 
- Many system designers regard human beings as unreliable and inefficient, yet 
they still leave people to cope with those tasks that the designers could not think 
to automate. 
 
- In highly automated systems, the task of the human operator is to monitor the 
system to ensure that the automatics are working as they should. But it is well 
known that the best motivated people have trouble maintaining vigilance for 
long periods of time. 
 
- Skills need to be practised continuously in order to preserve them. Yet an 
automatic system that fails only very occasionally denies the human operator the 
opportunity to practice the skills that will be called upon in an emergency 
situation.  
 
- The most successful automated system with rare need for manual intervention 
may need the greatest investment in operator training.  
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2.4 Review of Risk Methods 
It has become clear that human factors often have not been adequately addressed in the 
analysis and control of major accident risk in drilling and other offshore operations 
(McAndrews 2011). One area where other industries, like nuclear, has come further 
than the petroleum industry, is in the integration of human factors and human reliability 
analysis (HRA) in particular, into major accident risk analysis (Gould et al. 2012). HRA 
is used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess human performance, and is usually part 
of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) that includes both technical systems and the 
human operators (s) (Bedford & Cooke 2001). McAndrews (2011) believe that 
integration of HRA in major accident risk analyses is a promising path to improved 
safety and reliability of safety- critical systems in the petroleum industry. In this thesis 
the focus is on qualitative analysis. Qualitative research points to any kind of research 
that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means 
of quantification (Golafshani 2003). It is exploratory and inductive in nature and often 
use interviews and observations as a base  (Patton 2005). 
The main steps of a HRA is to identify critical operations where human errors could 
lead to accidents, analyse relevant tasks and break them down into subtasks, identify 
potential human error modes and potential error causes, and determine the human error 
probabilities for each error mode (Rausand 2013). A report, ―Human Factors Methods: 
Functional and Task Analysis according to requirement stipulated in NORSOK S-002. 
Best Practice‖ by Øie & Fernander (2009) gives a well introduction to some of the 
methods that can be used in HRA. This section will further comment on those analysis 
techniques employed in the thesis. Evaluations and limitations of them are found in 
section 5.3. According to the Norwegian petroleum standards: 
During concept definition and optimization, the activity shall include (NORSOK 2008):  
- a functional analysis and allocation describing functions to be performed, 
defining system performance requirements, and allocating manual and/or 
automatic functions (4.4.5.0-5)   
- a task analysis defining tasks based on allocated functions, and defining 
requirements (time, cognitive demands, etc.) for operator tasks, including 
information needed and the interface devices necessary to handle these tasks 
(4.4.5.0-6).  
Further, the Petroleum Safety Authorities states that (PSA 2008): 
- Installations, systems, and equipment shall be designed in the most robust and 
simple manner possible and such that the possibility for human error is limited 
PSA, The Facility regulation, Section 10. 
 
Functional analysis is the examination of the functional goals of a system with respect 
to available manpower, technology, and other resources, to provide the basis for 
determining how the function may be assigned and executed (NEK 2009). A variant of 
functional analysis is called Functional Analysis System Technique (FAST). FAST 
focuses on identifying system functions and is often used to allocate functions to human 
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and machine (Creasy, 1980). Allocation of functions (AF) is the process of distributing 
tasks, system functions, or responsibilities between human and machines based on their 
capabilities (Stanton 2006). It is performed to optimize performance, make the work 
done more efficient, which increase safety, quality, and profits (Beevis et al. 1996).  
This process is often based on Fitts list from 1951 (Table 7), with the overall 
recommendation that those functions that are better performed by machines should be 
automated, while the other functions should be assigned to a human operator. The list is 
no longer valid in its original state as machines have long since surpassed humans in 
many of his categories; though, it is still frequently cited today (de Winter & Dodou 
2011). However, Jordan (1963) points out that men and machines are complementary 
rather than comparable, and Price (1985) claims that there are tasks that neither 
machines nor humans do well and tasks that machines and humans both do well.   
Table 6: The original Fitts list. Adapted from de Winter & Dodou (2011 (de Winter & 
Dodou 2011). 
Humans appear to surpass present-day 
machines in respect to following: 
Present-day machines appear to surpass 
humans in respect to the following: 
1. Ability to detect small amount of visual or 
acoustic energy  
a. Ability to respond quickly to control 
signals  
2. Ability to perceive patterns of light and 
sound 
c. Ability to store information briefly and 
then to erase it completely 
3. Ability to improvise and use flexible 
procedures 
d. Ability to reason deductively, including 
computational ability 
4. Ability to store large amounts of 
information for long periods and to recall 
relevant facts at the appropriate time 
e. Ability to handle highly, complex, 
operations i.e. to do many different things at 
once 
5 Ability to reason inductively f. Ability to apply great force smoothly and 
precisely 
6 Ability to exercise judgment  
 
Task Analysis is the study of what an operator (or a team of operators) is required to do 
in terms of action and/or cognitive processes to achieve system goals (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth 2004). The analysis comprises a breakdown of tasks into subtasks with a 
fundamental approach of assisting in reaching higher safety and productivity standards 
(Rosness 1994). Task analysis covers a range of varieties, used by ergonomists, 
designers, operators, and assessors to describe or evaluate the human-machine 
interactions in a system. In addition, the results can be used to assess and evaluate 
operability workload, identify and help prevent human error, and identify 
communication needs (Øie & Fernander 2009). Different varieties of task analysis have 
been described (Kirwan & Ainsworth 2004), with hierarchical task analysis (HTA) as 
one of them. HTA was first proposed in the late 1960s. Since then, it has been widely 
adopted and used in many application areas, such as process control, military 
applications, aviation, and power generation (Shepherd & Stammers 2005). 
Human Error Identification (HEI) techniques are used to predict potential human or 
operator error in complex, dynamic system. The method was originally developed in 
response to a number of human operator errors related catastrophes in the domain of 
nuclear and chemical power domains (Three Mile Island disaster, Chernobyl). Today, 
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HEI is widespread in nuclear power and petro-chemical processing industries, air traffic 
control (Shorrock & Kirwan 2002), aviation (Stanton et al. 2009), and public 
technology (Baber & Stanton 1996). Different HEI techniques have been described 
(Stanton & Walker 2013); however, the literature consistently suggests that The 
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) is the most 
promising of the HEI techniques available in terms of performance (Kirwan 1992). In 
essence, the SHERPA technique works by indicating which error modes are credible for 
each step in analysis such as HTA (Embrey 1986). Studies reported in SHERPA show 
how it can be applied to the evaluation in aviation (Stanton et al. 2009) and oil 
extraction (Stanton & Wilson 2000).   
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3 Methods 
This section describes the different methods applied to examine if automated MPD may 
influence the risk of well control incidents by its effect on human errors. These methods 
include collecting data, creating a scenario, perform a functional analysis of an MPD 
system, allocate functions to human and machine, carry out a task analysis on lost 
circulation scenario, and identifying human error (See figure 15). The flow lends well to 
requirements from NORSOK S-002 (2008) and The Facility Regulations, PSA (2008).   
 
 
Figure 15: A flowchart of the different methods performed in this thesis. Objectives can be 
found in section 1.2, while the other methods are described in the current section.  
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3.1 Creating a Scenario 
The purpose of selecting a scenario is to give the analyst a way of capturing how the 
system functions in a given situation. This means that the description of the scenario 
also will cover not only the actions that take place, but also the contextual factors that 
surround the action, allow it to happen, and provide opportunities for errors (Fields et 
al. 1997). The objectives highlight that well control incidents are in focus. As lost 
circulation is a critical well control event which can escalate from kick to a blowout, 
this scenario was chosen as a scope to study.  
Table 7:  Description of the event Lost Circulation during MPD drilling operation.  
 Description 
Agents The scenario takes place on a drilling platform where drilling operation is 
performed by the driller and an MPD operator, with the other crew members 
present. The primary job of the two is to reach the target, maintaining safety 
by keeping pressure in the well within drilling window, and comply with the 
feedback of the system.   
Rationale This scenario highlights a relevant challenge that the industry most probable 
will have the focus on in the years to come. The reason is the need for 
technology to drill reservoirs that cannot be drilled conventionally. 
Situation and 
Environment 
The scenario involves detecting an abnormal situation during drilling, and 
regaining control of the well. The scenario begins just before the agents are 
given indications that mud might be lost to the formation.  
As MPD is not a widely used method today, the signals from the well may be 
more difficult for the driller and MPD operator to spot. Also, more personnel 
than usual are involved in the operation which could affect the level of 
awareness and stress.  
Task Context In the execution of this scenario, the driller carries out a number of tasks and 
will need to draw on substantial task knowledge that he possess as a result of 
experience and training. The tasks include performing the drilling operation, 
monitor well parameters, communicate the operation, and function as a team 
leader. The MPD operator need to monitor the system, communicate with 
different personnel, follow the operation, and adjust parameters to the system 
when required.  
System Context The operators are supported by modern drilling equipment and software 
applications. These need to be monitored and adjusted throughout the 
duration of the scenario. 
Action 
 
As the event of losses to formation is not standard, a sequence was chosen 
which includes that a) losses are observed, b) a flowcheck indicates that 
severe losses (>6 m3/hour) is present, c) the system is not able to maintain 
wellbore pressure with mud pumps and backpressure pump, d) losses are 
cured by filling well using kill line and pumping lost circulation materials, 
and finally e) the drilling strategy is adjusted and operation can continue. To 
fulfil the goals, a close collaboration between the driller and MPD operator is 
essential.   
Exceptional 
circumstances 
The scenario can develop in many different directions, all dependent on the 
severity of losses. Either the lost circulation event can be fixed at an earlier 
stage, or it can develop into a situation where the well takes a kick.   
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3.2 Data Collection 
Planning of a human reliability analysis (HRA) was conducted with the first issue to 
address as to whether the analysis should be qualitative or quantitative. As the 
objectives of the thesis are more focused towards system’s vulnerabilities to human 
errors and not to quantify these, qualitative analysis was suggested to be sufficient (The 
Energy Institute, 2012). Data was collected through a pre-study and a case study. 
 
Pre-Study and Interviews  
Different professionals shared their view on possibilities and challenges by using 
Managed Pressure Drilling. The purpose of this study was to find out if a selection of 
persons within the MPD community believed in the method, and if so, which challenges 
the method holds. In addition, the participants’ answers formed part of a triangulation 
with findings found in analyses and relevant theory to be used in section 5. Discussion. 
The respondents comprised:  
- Principal Researcher at Statoil 
- Senior Research Scientist, SINTEF 
- Research Scientist, SINTEF 
- Drilling Engineering Advisor and researcher on human factors 
- Senior researchers at DNV GL 
- Personnel on the drilling rig Transocean Spitsbergen with hands-on experience, 
including data operator, drilling supervisor, derrickman and mud engineers   
The research was evaluated using the criteria credibility, transferability, dependability 
and conformability (Patton 2005).  
 
Case Study 
Halliburton AS, an oilfield service company and a supplier of MPD, was contacted with 
the aim of using their Geobalance system as a case for the human factor analyses. With 
acceptance from the MPD Manager in Sperry Drilling, one of Halliburton’s product 
lines, the author was provided access to information which included:   
- System descriptions 
- Procedures 
- Piping and instrumentation diagram/drawing (P&ID) 
- Pictures and figures 
- Field cases 
This information formed the base for the scenario that will be explained in the next 
section. Further, MPD operators within the company explained functions and the 
process of MPD, and helped with the task analysis explained later i the thesis.  
While writing this thesis, the author has been working as a Mud Engineer in the 
offshore petroleum industry. Observations from offshore operation and asking questions 
during work have aided in understanding drilling technology and well control.    
Methods 
38 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
The following subsections hold the procedures for the different analyses performed, 
which includes functional analysis, task analysis, and human error identification.  
 
3.3.1 Functional Analysis  
Functional Analysis System Technique (FAST) focuses on identifying system functions 
that are needed to fulfill a goal. The analysis was used to allocate functions to human 
and machine, and find out which equipment are critical to control/monitor functions. 
The procedure was performed as follows:   
1. System functions were identified in terms of the main goal phrased as 
―Maintaining BHP within drilling window‖.   
2. A horizontal chart was organized from left to right answering the question: 
―How is the function to its immediate left performed?‖ 
The sequence of functions proceeding from right to left answered the question: 
―Why is the next function performed?‖  
3. The diagram was complete when all the how and why questions could be 
answered by referring to the model. 
 
3.3.2 Allocation of Functions 
Allocation of functions was used to allocate functions to human and machine, identify 
responsibilities, mode of automation, and evaluating the allocation according to Fitts 
list. The procedure was performed as follows:   
1. The functions identified in the FAST analysis were dedicated to human and 
machines during drilling and lost circulation event, with the different categories: 
– H: Human only 
– M: Machine only 
– H-C: shared between human and computer, human in control 
– C-H: shared between human and computer, computer in control 
2. The equipment involved with the functions and the personnel responsible were 
identified. 
3. The allocation was evaluated according to Fitts list (Table 7).  
 
3.3.3 Task Analysis 
HTA was performed based on information obtained from Halliburton AS. The analysis 
was to decompose tasks and identify the responsible person of each task. Further, the 
was used to identify human errors. The procedure was performed as follows: 
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1. The analysis was planned and prepared 
a. The objective was defined. 
b. The work was organized. 
c. Background information was aquired 
2. The overall goal of the task was defined.  
3. The task subgoals were determined.  
4. Each subgoal was further decomposed. The decomposition continued as far as 
required with the lowest level as an action that represented what needed to be 
done. At the point where tasks were split into subtasks, plans were analyzed. 
These were used to specify how tasks were meant to be executed.  
5. The analysis was reported in a diagram.  
 
 
3.3.4 Human Error Identification 
The Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) was used 
to identify human errors from the task analysis. The analysis was performed to support 
the thesis main objective. The procedure was performed as follows:  
1. The tasks or scenario was described in the HTA.  
2. The first bottom level task step in HTA was classified according to the SHERPA 
behavior taxonomy (See table 8):  
a. Action (e.g., pressing a button) 
b. Retrieval (e.g., getting information from a screen or manual) 
c. Checking (e.g., conducting a procedural check) 
d. Selection e.g., choosing one alternative over another) 
e. Information communication (e.g., talking to another party)  
3. Human errors were identified. The associated error mode taxonomy and domain 
expertise was used to determine any credible error modes for the task in 
question. For each credible error (i.e., those judged to be possible) a description 
of the form that the error would take was given. 
4. Consequence analysis. The consequences for the well associated with the errors 
identified in step 3 was determined and described.  
5. The recovery potential of the error was identified either as none, immediate or at 
another stage of the analysis.  
6. Probability of error occurring was given a value of Low (L), Medium (M), or 
High (H).  
7. The criticality of the error in question was then rated. Normally, if an error 
would lead to a critical incident (in relation to the task in question) then it was 
rated as a highly critical error.  
8. Error reduction strategies were proposed. Normally, remedial measures are 
comprised of suggested changes to the design of the process or system. 
Remedial measures are normally proposed under the following four categories: 
a. Equipment (e.g., redesign or modification of existing equipment) 
b. Training (e.g., changes in training provided) 
c. Procedures (e.g., provision of new, or redesign of old procedures) 
d. Organizational (e.g., change in organizational policy or culture) 
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Table 8: The Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) 
behavior taxonomy (Rausand 2013). 
Action Errors Checking Errors 
A1 – Operation too long/short C1 – Check omitted 
A2 – Operation mistimed C2 - Check incomplete 
A3 – Operation in wrong direction C3 - Right check on wrong object 
A4 – Operation too little/much C4 – Wrong check on right object 
A5 – Misalign C5 – Check mistimed 
A6 – Right operation on wrong object C6 – Wrong check on wrong object 
A7 – Wrong operation on right object Communication Errors 
A8 – Operation omitted I1 – Information not communicated 
A9 – Operation incomplete I2 – Wrong information communicated 
A10 – Wrong operation on wrong object I3 – Information communication 
Retrieval Errors Selection Errors 
R1 – Information not obtained S1 – Selection omitted 
R2 – Wrong information obtained S2 – Wrong selection made  
R3 – Information retrieval incomplete  
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4 Results 
The overall aim of this section is to present the findings of the work performed in this 
thesis. Results from the pre-study are first given, in which possibilities and challenges 
with MPD are discussed. Next, the findings from human factor methods; functional 
analysis (FAST), task analysis (HTA) and human error identification (SHERPA) are 
given. These are founded upon the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) and Norwegian 
petroleum standards (NORSOK-S002). Finally, a table is presented with the aim of 
combining the analyses.  
 
4.1 Results from the Pre-Study 
The information presented in this subsection is obtained from different researches and 
technical professionals contacted by email and phone. Their answers are joined into one 
text and further used in the discussion to support the thesis objectives. The pre-study 
itself correlates to the thesis’ sub-objective 3 (Section 1.2).  
 
Possibilities with MPD 
MPD facilitates reduction of pressure variances in the well which further enables 
drilling of wells with a tight drilling window that cannot be drilled conventionally. The 
reduction in pressure variance also reduces risk of losses and kicks as it is possible to 
change pressure in the well quicker than when traditional methods are applied. In 
addition, the wellbore pressure can be changed continuously as the actual pore and 
fracture pressure is revealed during drilling.  
MPD provides improved well control due to earlier loss and kick detection when using 
Coriolis flow meter. This can reduce operational costs as less time is spent on handling 
such well control situations. As a result, non-productive time (NPT) is reduced. Other 
factors that can save costs are the ability to drill faster because of lower BHP and trip 
faster by compensating for swab and surge. 
 
Challenges with MPD 
MPD is not widely employed today due to high expenses related to integrating the 
equipment on the rig, and operational costs as extra personnel and equipment is needed 
onboard. It is difficult to defend these expenses if the well can be drilled conventionally; 
therefore MPD is only used on the most challenging wells. 
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MPD equipment failure can lead to influx if the well is drilled with light mud in static 
underbalance. These failures could be leakage of rotating control device (RCD), wash 
out of choke, and failure of the control system leading to wrong opening of the choke. 
Often, MPD systems have built-in redundancies to such failures. Other failures on 
traditional equipment may be washing out of drill pipe, kick/loss, pack-off, and power 
loss on the rig. 
As with recent aviation accidents, a significant challenge is when the operators come to 
depend on the automated system to the point where they lose their skill in operating the 
system manually. An additional challenge is the competence of the rig team and 
coordination between the MPD operator and the driller. Today, the MPD operators are 
usually sitting in a unit separate from the drill floor where communication is done with 
a radio. To have an effective pressure control, good collaboration between the driller 
and the MPD operator is essential, especially when ramping up and down the rig pumps. 
If the mud pumps are ramped too fast, the MPD control system may not follow which in 
turn could lead to losses or influx. The quality of collaboration is often dependent on 
how well they are trained and how much they practice together as a team.   
When the choke is automatically controlled, pressure variances that could give 
information to the driller about kick or other well problems may be hidden. Also, if 
something goes wrong, it is important to fully understand the equipment. This includes 
understanding the real time models and controlling systems that control the automation. 
Many operators do not have this understanding. 
In an ideal world, the MPD equipment should be integrated in the drilling control 
system and operated by the driller, such that it would be possible to set in a RCD and 
change over to MPD modus if needed.  
 
4.2 Results from Analyses 
This subsection includes the different human factor analyses performed, and thereby 
correlates to thesis’ sub-objective 2 (Section 1.2). These are functional analysis, 
allocation of functions, human error identification. 
 
Functional Analysis 
Functional Analysis System Technique, FAST, adapted from Handal et al. (2013),  
demonstrates how the MPD system fulfills the goal ―Maintain BHP within drilling 
window‖ (figure 16). This is considered the most important goal during drilling when it 
comes to maintaining well control, i.e. the prevention of kick and losses. The functions 
highlighted in yellow are also found in the task analysis presented later in this section 
and are therefore particularly vulnerable to human errors. The functional analysis will 
further we used to allocate functions to human or machine.  
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Figure 16: A function tree of an MPD pressure control system with the overall goal 
Maintain BHP within drilling window. The goal i decomposed into different sub functions. 
Yellow functions are also part of the task analysis. The tree is adapted from Handal et al. 
(2013).  
Allocation of Functions 
The allocation of functions analysis distributes functions identified in the previous 
analysis (Figure 16) to human, machine, or both (Table 9). The functions are allocated 
when the system is employed during normal drilling operation and in a lost circulation 
event (Table 6). Further, the table connects the functions to Fitts list (Table 7) with 
comments. The last row suggests the mode of automation for the two different 
situations, with the different categories found in Table 5. 
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Task Analysis 
A Hierarchical Task Analysis was performed on the scenario ―severe losses to the 
formation‖ (Table 6). The analysis illustrates the tasks required to achieve the system 
goal ―0.0 Deal With lost Circulation‖. The different steps are based on a flowchart 
obtained from Halliburton AS. Handling losses are a critical well control operation with 
potential to escalate. The scenario is therefore appropriate for evaluating well control 
and to identify human errors from the tasks. The process from observing losses to cure 
losses is illustrated in the following figures. Below each figure, a more thorough 
explanation is given of each step. In the second level, the person responsible for the 
different subtasks is identified: 
- M = MPD operator 
- D = Driller 
- O = Other 
 
Figure 17: Hierarchical Task Analysis for the event 0.0 Deal with lost circulation.  
The operation prior to the scenario is drilling. The event starts by observing losses (1.0) 
to the formation with following actions (2.0). The losses are calculated to be above 6 m
3
 
per hour which is categorized as severe. The main task becomes to maintain wellbore 
(WB) pressure above pore pressure (3.0). At the end of the scenario, the losses are cured 
(4.0). All tasks performed throughout the operation are communicated on the radio. The 
main personnel involved are the driller and the MPD operator. In addition, a data 
operator (or a mud logger) from a third party is monitoring parameters on a separate 
screen, i.e. pressures and mud volume. In addition, he communicates losses or gain on 
the radio; however this is not illustrated in the analysis (Figure 17).  
A lost circulation event is detected by the driller and the MPD operator by hearing an 
alarm (1.1) and observing a screen (1.2). The alarm starts due to decreasing pit volumes, 
less mud returns from the well, and a pressure drop in the drill pipe and the casing. The 
information is communicated to other relevant personnel (1.3), such as the toolpusher 
(rig contractor) and the drilling supervisor (rig operator) (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18: Hierarchical Task Analysis for the subgoal “1.0 Observe Losses”.  
 
 
Figure 19: Hierarchical Task Analysis for the subgoal “2.0 Act on confirmed losses”. 
The driller continues to pump and rotate the pipe (2.1). However, the bit is raised off 
bottom such that new formation is not drilled (2.2). To deal with the losses, the MPD 
operator changes the system to Manual Mode (2.3.1) and reduces the choke pressure in 
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steps by changing the set points on the system (2.3.2). Additionally, this means to 
increase the opening of the choke. When reducing the choke pressure, the pressure in 
the well will also decrease. The MPD operator verifies that the choke is responding by 
checking the back pressure upstream of the choke, and by examining percentage 
opening of the choke (2.3.3). The steps are repeated until desired pressure is obtained 
which is should be above pore pressure (2.3). Thereafter, loss rate is observed, which in 
this case is categorized as severe (Figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 20 Hierarchical Task Analysis for the subgoal “3.0 Maintain wellbore pressure”. 
 
The first action in maintaining wellbore pressure is to maintain backpressure (3.1). The 
driller stops to circulate to prevent further losses (3.1.1), which removes the friction 
pressure. The annulus is filled using the backpressure pump, now operated manually 
(3.1.2). Again, choke pressure is decreased in steps by increasing the opening of the 
choke to observe if the pressure in the well holds (3.1.4). However, the scenario states 
that the loss rate is higher than the backpressure pump capacity. Two options are 
available: (a) Exit MPD mode and close the BOP (3.2.1.1a). The continued operation is 
then performed by applying conventional drilling methods. This will not be further 
elaborated in this thesis. (b) Pump mud into annulus with BPP (3.2.1.1b) while filling 
the hole through a kill line. The last option will proceed in the HTA. Simultaneously 
with pumping from BPP and mud pumps down kill line, lost circulation materials 
(LCM) are pumped through the drillpipe (3.2.3). In such a scenario, the LCM fluid seals 
off the fractures in the well and losses are stopped.   
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Figure 21 Hierarchical Task Analysis for the subgoal “4.0 Cure losses”. 
 
Losses are cured with LC materials. However, to prevent losses to start again, the 
pressure strategy may have to be changed (4.2). This decision is made in cooperation 
between onshore and offshore organization (4.1). When the decision is made, the driller 
and the MPD operator continue the operation to reach the target (4.3).  
 
Human Error Identification 
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) was 
performed on the lowest level of tasks described in the task analysis (Table 10). The 
consequences describe how the error will affect the state of the well. Basically, two 
different scenarios can follow, (a) the losses become worse and/or (b) a kick can occur 
due to too low wellbore pressure.  
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Combining the Analyses 
The FAST analysis identifies functions that are critical to ―Maintain BHP within 
drilling window‖. This is also regarded as the primary well barrier. Functions that also 
were part of the task analysis were identified and marked with a yellow color in the 
FAST tree (Figure 16). Human errors connected to these tasks can therefore be regarded 
as especially serious as they are correlated to functions that re critical in maintaining 
primary well control (Table 11).  
 
Table 11: Functions from the FAST analysis also found in the HTA with the person 
responsible of performing the task. SHERPA illustrates human errors that could take 
place.   
FAST Allocating 
task to: 
HTA SHERPA 
1.1.1 Control mud 
volume 
 
Driller Many, 
like 
2.1  
Continue pump and 
rotate 
A7 Wrong 
operation on 
right object 
2.1.1 Monitor 
pressure 
 
Driller and 
MPD 
operator 
1.2.2   Observe casing 
pressure falls 
C1 Check omitted 
2.2.2 Monitor 
flow 
 
Driller and 
MPD 
operator 
1.2.3  Observe decreased 
pit volume 
C1 Check omitted 
2.3.1 Regulate 
adjustable 
choke 
MPD 
operator 
2.3.3.1  Obs./Check choke 
backpressure on 
display 
C1 Check omitted 
2.3.2 Regulate 
BPP 
 
MPD 
operator 
3.1.2.2 Start BPP A8 
 
A4 
Operation 
omitted 
Operation too 
little/much 
2.3.3 Regulate 
mud pumps 
Driller 3.1.1  Stop circulate A4 Operation too 
little/much 
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5 Discussion 
This section aims to discuss the thesis’ main objective; the concept of automation in 
Managed Pressure Drilling and how it may influence the risk of well control incidents 
by its effect on human errors. The discussion is based on relevant theory coupled with a 
pre-study on possibilities and challenges with MPD from different technical 
professionals’ point of view (section 4.1). The Constant Bottom Hole Pressure system, 
Geobalance, from Halliburton AS was given the role of an example MPD system. The 
different analyses that will be discussed are functional analysis, allocation of functions, 
task analysis, and human error identification. In addition, the change in level of 
automation from a normal operation to a well control incident will be looked upon, with 
a recommendation of future mode of automation. Finally, this section will discuss 
strengths and limitations with the methodology.  
The thesis’ objectives are encouraged by the need for new technologies that facilitate 
drilling of wells with a narrow drilling window that cannot be drilled with traditional 
methods. It has been proposed that MPD decreases risk of well control incidents by an 
improved automatic pressure control in the well and earlier kick or loss detection 
compared to conventional drilling (Section 4.1). MPD’s inherent closed loop setup, 
coupled with conventional methodologies, naturally lends itself to an automated 
philosophy (Saeed et al. 2012). One of the fundamental motives for introducing 
automation into complex systems is to lessen the chance of human error; however, this 
may not always be the case (Reason 1995). The analyses performed in this thesis are 
founded upon the Norwegian petroleum Standards which states that functional analysis 
and allocation of functions, including a task analysis shall be performed in the concept 
phase of design (NORSOK 2008). Further, the Petroleum Safety Authorities requires 
equipment to be designed such that the possibility of human error is limited (PSA 
2008).     
 
5.1 Evaluation of Results 
According to (McAndrews 2011), human factors are not adequate addressed in the 
analysis and control of major accidents in drilling and offshore operations. The 
qualitative analyses in the following discussion could form part of a human reliability 
analysis, which is related to the field of human factors. HRA is believed to be a 
promising path to improved safety and reliability of safety-critical systems in the 
petroleum industry (Gould et al. 2012).  
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Functional Analysis 
The functional analysis, FAST, was performed to identify system functions that were 
needed to fulfil the main goal, ―Maintain BHP within drilling window‖ (Figure 16). 
Maintaining BHP within the drilling window is a critical function and the primary well 
barrier (Figure 4), which means that the pressure exerted by the mud must be situated 
between the pore- and the fracture pressure (Figure 3). If the operational goal fails and 
not addressed immediately, serious consequences such as kick, with a further potential 
of blowout, or losses to the formation could follow. Thus, this is a well-defined goal in 
regards to the main objective of the thesis; to examine risk of well control incidents. In 
addition, together with relevant theory in section 2.1.2 and section 2.1.3, the FAST 
analysis fulfills part of the thesis’ sub-objective 1, to establish an MPD system 
description, and sub-objective 2, to focus on achieving system goals, such as primary 
well control. The analysis was further used to allocate functions to human and machine.  
The functions were diagrammed into a FAST tree. The main goal described in the 
previous paragraph was decomposed to its respective sub-functions ―1 Maintaining 
sufficient hydraulic pressure‖ and ―2 Manage and control flow and pressure in the 
well‖. For conventional drilling, only the first sub-function, in addition to ―2.2 
Monitoring well parameters‖, is required to maintain BHP within drilling window. For 
MPD however, the mud weight is usually close to pore pressure and certain 
backpressure is necessary to drill the well overbalanced. Consequently, loss of 
backpressure may degrade the primary well barrier. Control of backpressure is therefore 
essential for well control, and is dependent on equipment, such as RCD, the adjustable 
choke, the backpressure pump and mud pumps, drillstring float valve, the monitoring 
system, and the MPD control unit. These components form part of the second sub-
function in the FAST tree.  
The FAST analysis may thus demonstrate that maintaining BHP within drilling window 
is more complex for MPD operations than for conventional drilling. However, as the 
method allows drilling of wells that cannot be drilled conventionally, adding complexity 
is suggested to be necessary. Rouse et al. (1992) claims that the increasingly complex 
systems may introduce team-related issues associated with communication, ambiguous 
information, and decision-making. Lessons learned from previous accidents, for 
example the Three Mile Island accident, proposes that human errors may be a 
contributing factor in, what Perrow designates, system accidents in complex systems 
(Perrow 1984). This gives a drive for further analyses of the MPD equipment.   
 
Allocation of Functions 
The allocation of functions was used in this thesis to evaluate allocation of an existing 
system, and to examine the change in mode of automation that occur when changing 
from normal drilling to a lost circulation event. The allocation was based on the end-
functions from the FAST diagram presented in the previous section, with additional 
identification of the person responsible for the function. In addition, Fitts list with 
capabilities of human and machine (Table 7) was used to argue for the allocation.  
Control mud volume, mud density, mud viscosity, and control hole cleaning are 
functions allocated to human and machine, with the human in control (Function 1.1.1-
1.2.1, and 2.3.3). These functions are related to mud parameters that are continuously 
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changing throughout the drilling operation. That means that allocating these to humans 
fit well with the capabilities of using flexible procedures and to exercise judgment. The 
skills are also important to hold during drilling, as the nature of the well, to some 
degree, is difficult to predict. Mud pumps and mud mixing machine, are performing the 
functions with instructions from the operator, which correlates well with the capability 
of machines to apply great force smoothly and precisely.  
The logic unit’s functions are fully allocated to the machine (Function 2.1.1-2.1.2). As 
machines are capable of responding quickly to control signals and to handle highly, 
complex operations, this allocation is suggested to be sound. Monitoring different 
parameters is performed both by the machine and the human (Function 2.2.1-2.3.4). If 
these values are abnormal, an alarm will start. The machine is only monitoring the 
present situation, which corresponds well with the ability of machines to store 
information briefly and then to erase it. Information is not directly erased, but the 
machine does not look back in time. The driller, MPD operator, and data operator are 
monitoring the signals and looking for trends. They are capable of detecting small 
amount of changes, and to store large amounts of information over long periods. 
Understanding some trends often come with experience, which suits the monitoring role 
well.  
The function ―Regulate adjustable choke‖ (Function 2.3.1) is performed automatically 
from the MPD choke manifold. The choke receives signals from the controller and 
responds quickly to control signals, which is one of the capabilities of machines in Fitts 
list. However, during lost circulation, the function of regulating the choke is changed 
from automatic to manual by setpoints entered by the MPD operator. According to Fitts 
list, the human operator has the ability to improvise and use flexible procedures, and to 
exercise judgments, which are capabilities that are needed during losses. The lost 
circulation event is described in table 6, with a statement that every lost circulation 
event is unique and requires adjusted procedures. The same arguments can be applied 
for the function ―Regulate backpressure pump‖ (Function 2.3.2). During normal 
drilling, the pump is ramped up and down automatically, while it is adjusted manually 
during lost circulation event. Saeed et al. (2012) has specified that these segments are 
the ones developed for automation during normal drilling.  
The last functions in table 9 are to contain fluid using a rotating control device 
(Function 2.4.1) and contain fluid using a drillstring float-valve (Function 2.4.2). These 
form the static MPD pressure control equipment, which means that they are set in place 
to either guide or prevent backflow of mud. No further comments will be made to these 
as they are not adjustable and intervention is only made if a system failure is detected. 
System failures are not looked upon in this thesis. 
As described in the previous paragraphs, the allocation of functions for the MPD system 
is evaluated to be sound according to the capabilities described in Fitts list. A different 
finding where the allocation was not sound could have been used to suggest a redesign 
of the system, to increase safety, quality, and profits. However, as the literature claims, 
humans and machines are often complementary rather than comparable (Jordan 1963), 
and limitations such as psychological needs or interactions are not considered in the list 
(de Winter & Dodou 2011; Hancock & Scallen 1998). Also, Fitts list is regarded as a 
scientific theory, and from this perspective, its aim is to explain or predict allocation of 
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functions, and not to be used to guide engineering decision. Thus, more analyses are 
required to present a more holistic picture of the human-machine interaction.  
      
Changes of Mode in Human-Machine Interface during Well Control Incident 
To examine changes of mode in human-machine interface during well control incident 
refers to the thesis’ sub-objective 2 from Section 1.2. Based on the allocation of 
functions in Table 9, mode of automation can be evaluated according to Table 5. 
Billings (1997) has already suggested that the MPD system has a mode 3 ―Management 
by Delegation‖. In this mode the automated system provides closed loop control of 
individual tasks, such as the choke pressure control. The MPD operator decides 
setpoints for the pressure in the wellbore, and allows the MPD system to maintain this 
pressure automatically using a hydraulic model and a controller. During a lost 
circulation event, the MPD operator overrides the system and has direct authority. 
Setpoints are continuously entered to adjust the choke manifold and the backpressure 
pump, which is illustrated in the task analysis performed in this thesis. The mode of 
automation has therefore changed from mode 3 to mode 1 ―Assisted Manual Control‖. 
This change is in accordance with the literature proclaiming that today’s automatic 
drilling systems are usually not replaced by the human, but the human and machine are 
acting together in a joint human-machine system. The performance could therefore be 
suggested to be improved during normal operation, while the operator can override the 
system in case of an abnormal operation (Breyholtz & Nikolaou 2012).  
Reason (1997) argues that functions that are too difficult to automate are left to the 
unrelliable operator to handle, which is one of the ironies of automation. Further, the 
same author suggests that the most successful automated systems with rare need for 
manual intervention may need the greatest investment in operator training. The factor 
training is not included in this thesis to evaluate human errors; however, Lorentsen 
(2012) has described a training sequence needed prior to an MPD operation. This 
includes classroom training, e-learning programs, and offshore training with simulation 
practice of different scenarios. A change from mode 3 to mode 1 with manual takeover 
could thus be suggested to suit the situation if the operators received sufficient 
information from the system to handle the situation and are well trained. This 
proposition is made without considering the factors situation awareness, trust, reliance, 
communication, workload, and mode of confusion which is mentioned in the thesis as 
underlying causes of human error (Endsley 1995; Parasuraman & Riley 1997; Woods 
2010). 
 
Task Analysis 
The functional analysis just described is evaluating functions and allocation in a 
relatively isolated way, therefore a task analysis was performed to demonstrate how 
functions are attended to in a given situation. This provides a more complete picture of 
which other tasks that are included in addition to the interaction with machine. The 
HTA was based on a flowchart obtained from Halliburton AS, and the case was 
established to be lost circulation (This thesis’ sub-objective 1). Lost circulation is 
classified to be a critical well control situation that could become severe. The scenario is 
described in Table 6.  
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The main goal of the task analysis, ―Deal with lost circulation, was decomposed into 
sub-tasks including ―1.0 Observe losses‖, ―2.0 Act on confirmed losses‖, ―3.0 Maintain 
wellbore pressure‖, ―4.0 Cure losses‖, and ―5.0 Communicate all steps on radio‖ 
(Figure 17). The responsible operator was identified at the next level of task 
decomposition. The task sequence suggests that the interaction between the different 
systems, the driller, and the MPD operator is complex, because responsibilities 
frequently changes between the operators. This proposes that the collaborations need to 
be accurate and well communicated on the radio. As declared in section 2.1.3, the MPD 
operator is situated in his own control cabin where the MPD equipment is run and 
monitored, while the driller sits in the drillers’ cabin. Findings from the pre-study (4.1), 
confirms that interaction between the driller and the MPD operator is seen as a 
challenge. One of the respondents suggests that the MPD equipment should be 
integrated in the drilling control system and operated by the driller. The literature agrees 
that team-work in highly complex systems are prone to errors (Le Bot 2004).   
One of the tasks involves closing the blowout-preventer (BOP) (Step 3.2.1.2.a). The 
author has not found a clear description or procedure on when the driller should close 
the BOP. According to an MPD operator, this is dependent on the rig operator, for 
instance Statoil. Without having a reference to this statement, it is the MPD operator 
who informs the driller that he should close the BOP. As the MPD operator is sitting in 
his unit trying to fix the problem, the driller cannot see what he is doing and is to some 
degree kept out of the loop even though communication is continuing on the radio. In 
worst case, the MPD operator could be trying for too long time to cure the losses while 
letting the driller know too late that he should close the well in. This stage if therefore 
highly critical and will be further commented in the SHERPA.  
 
Human Error Analysis 
According to Statoilasa (2012), about 60 percent of all well control incidents on a 
specific rig are related to human errors and misjudgments. The human error 
identification method, SHERPA was used to identify human errors from the task 
analysis. This method has been suggested to represent the most promising in terms of 
performance (Kirwan 2004). SHERPA also includes recovery potential, probability of 
the error occurring, criticality of the error, proposed error reduction strategies, and 
consequences for the well if a human error is made. Mainly two consequences to the 
well were identified from the SHERPA: 1) increased pressure in the well leading to 
more severe fracturing of the formation, and 2) not being able to maintain bottomhole 
pressure with the potential of kick.  
One of the major concerns during lost circulation is if a failure of keeping the hole full 
results in a kick (Halle 2010). The combination from the SHERPA analysis of: 1) none 
recovery, and 2) P = L/M/H, and 3) C = !, is suggested to be categorized as highly 
severe. The consequences of such a situation are reduced BHP to the state where a kick 
occurs. If not handled properly, the kick could develop into a blowout with potential 
damage to people, equipment, and the environment. The detection of kick is suggested 
to be more challenging when the well also fails to retain mud, as kick detection in an 
MPD system is based on flow-in and flow-out (Rehm & Paknejad 2008). A similar 
situation occurred on the platform Gullfaks C, where losses through a hole in the casing 
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reduced the fluid column and led to a kick from the open hole. During that event, the 
MPD equipment was put on hold while the well control operations continued for almost 
two months before the barriers were reinstalled (Statoil 2010). Such a highly severe 
consequence is therefore realistic.  
Human errors from the last level on the task analysis ―0.0 Deal with lost circulation 
were identified‖. The first part of the task analysis involves detecting losses (1.1.1-
1.3.2). Loss of well control signs should be known by all personnel on the platform 
(Baker & Fitzpatrick 1998). In addition, the pre-study (4.1) claims that MPD offers 
earlier kick and loss detection. Therefore, it is proposed that the risk of not detecting a 
lost circulation event is low. On the other hand, (Sheridan & Parasuraman 2005) 
discusses that trust and reliance to the automation could take the attention away from a 
subset of tasks giving other tasks a higher focus. The signals may not be detected 
because of overreliance to, for example, alarms. An additional reason for not paying 
attention to the screen and alarms could be that the operators rely and trust in someone 
else watching the operation. The data operator’s task is to monitor screens at all times, 
however, occasionally he has errands outside the office that may cause for distraction. 
The literature also describes that lost situation awareness due to automation may lead to 
extra time for the operator to detect problems and reorient themselves (Endsley & Kiris 
1995). These are human-performance shaping factors, which are not evaluated in an 
analysis in this thesis. However, they form part of the thesis’ sub-objective 3, to discuss 
advantages and disadvantages in relation to major accident scenario and human errors.  
Task steps where human error could result in a highly severe situation are ―2.1 Continue 
pump and rotate‖, ―3.1.1 Stop circulating‖, and ―3.2.1.1b Close BOP‖. A failure to 
perform these tasks may have the consequence of not maintaining the wellbore pressure 
above pore pressure which could escalate into a kick and further to a blowout. 
Therefore, these errors are categorized as highly severe. A shared link between these 
task steps is the interaction and communication between the driller and the MPD 
operator. If the driller halts the mud pumps instead of continued pumping, the 
backpressure pump, operated by the MPD operator, should engage. However, an 
inadequate coordination between the pumps could lead to not enough mud volume 
being pumped into the well. The action ―Stop circulating‖ could be performed too fast 
and holds the same argument about coordinating the pumps; a challenge that is 
recognized in Breyholtz et al. (2009) and in the pre-study (Section 4.1).  
The most severe human error identified is connected to the task ―3.2.1.2a Close the 
BOP‖, with the error being not to close the BOP, which involved secondary well 
control. The reason for this error could be many, both that the MPD operator did not 
inform the driller that he should close it, or that the procedure did not state well enough 
at what time the action should be carried out. The literature suggests that if many 
operators are working in teams, it could be difficult for them to share the same 
awareness. Failure of deciding when to close the BOP corresponds well with the 
statement that humans are more prone to make mistaken judgment about the state of the 
system instead of making slips and lapses (Reason 2008). The findings also agree with 
the literature claiming that decision making in complex systems may be characterized 
by ambiguous information, and that communication and coordination are central issues. 
For an effective operation of dealing with lost circulation, the operators must work 
together as team and adapt to changing task demands.  
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Another type of error described in the literature is mode confusion where the operator is 
not aware of what the system is doing or understands why it behaves differently than 
expected. An example of this error from the SHERPA analysis is ―2.3.1.1 Select manual 
mode‖, where the operator could omit to perform the action and continue the operation 
in a wrong mode. However, it is suggested that this task will have an immediate 
recovery when the operator notices that the backpressure pump or the choke is not 
responding as requested. Reason (2000) also describes latent errors, which are errors 
likely to be made due to systems or routines that are formed in such a way that humans 
are disposed to making these errors. The coordination of mud pumps and backpressure 
pump could be seen as a latent human error as two different operators are involved in 
the coordination. However, an alternative to the backpressure pump already exists. 
According to Saeed et al. (2013), the rig pump diverter replaces the backpressure pump 
which in turn decreases the potential of human error. The rig pump diverter is not yet 
used on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (pers.com. Tim Tønnesen, MPD Manager, 
Halliburton AS).    
In regards to the driller, it has been suggested that automation could result in an 
increased demand on the user’s memory, or cause the operator to be uncertain as to 
where he should focus his attention (Woods 2010). During an MPD operation, the 
driller has more screens to monitor (figure 11) and he has to perform the operation 
while also remembering his new types of tasks. Another statement is that automation 
could lead to increased stress and workload during periods of high-demands, such as the 
event described in the task analysis (Figure 17). It could be proposed that that the 
procedure of fixing lost circulation is more complex using MPD since a dynamical shift 
exists between the driller and MPD operator. The operation needs to be coordinated and 
communicated to more personnel than during conventional drilling. On the other hand, 
a more fine-tuning of the BHP by the MPD system could be suggested to aid in 
stopping the losses earlier, and hence benefits dealing with lost circulation.  
 
Combining the Analyses 
The feasibility of the combination of analyses performed in this thesis is further 
discusses. Tasks identified in the task analysis, that also was found in the FAST analysis 
could be suggested to be particularly vulnerable to human errors. The reason is that 
these functions are critical for maintaining BHP within the drilling window, or the 
primary well control. The functions identified were control mud volume, monitor 
pressure and flows, regulated adjustable choke and BPP, and regulate mud pumps. The 
human errors identified include action errors and checking errors. From the allocation of 
functions (Table 9), and from the task analysis itself, it is identified that both the driller 
and the MPD operator are responsible for these functions. Therefore, together they hold 
a vital responsibility of maintaining the primary well barrier. What is not illustrated 
when combining the analyses performed are however, the tasks only made when 
changing from a normal drilling to a lost circulation event. These include the manual 
takeover of the MPD pressure control equipment and closing the blowout-preventer. 
The task analysis is therefore central for accomplishing the thesis’ objectives.   
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5.2 Future Mode of Automation 
The thesis’ sub-objective 4 describes that a future mode of automation for MPD systems 
should be recommended. Different points of views need to be addressed to fulfill this 
goal, and the author recognizes that it is challenging to predict future developments. 
However, parts of the literature and learning from other industries, such as aviation, 
may be helpful. As a reminder, automation is to introduce control system and 
information technology that gain in reducing the physical and/or mental workload of 
human operators that are in charge of running the process. In the current drilling 
industry, humans are usually not replaced by automated systems; instead they are acting 
in a joint human-machine system (Breyholtz & Nikolaou 2012)  
It has been found that in many environments, automation has improved efficiency, 
enhanced safety, and reduced the operator’s workload (Endsley 1999). At the same 
time, introduction of automation has demonstrated new problems and changed the 
nature of cognitive work of human operators. Several human performance issues have 
arisen because automated systems have been designed from a technology-centered 
perspective (Woods 2010). These include unbalanced mental workload, reduced 
situational awareness, and trust, both under-trust and over-trust. At times, such factors 
have led to incidents and accidents. (Parasuraman et al. 2008).  
A flexible interaction between humans and automation is thought to provide benefits 
like improved situation awareness, improved workload, and improved overall human-
machine performance relative to either human alone or machine alone (Miller & 
Parasuraman 2007; Parasuraman et al. 2008). More recently, the function allocation 
process has focused on how the human and the automation can complement each other, 
and jointly satisfy the functions required for system success. This alternative method is 
called adaptive functional allocation (AFA) (Hancock & Scallen 1996; Scallen & 
Hancock 2001). In AFA, the control of functions shifts between humans and machines 
dynamically, based on specified thresholds for environmental factors, operator 
competence, or psychobiological factors (Parasuraman & Wickens 2008). Such an 
interpretation could be beneficial to have in mind when designing future MPD system. 
In the discipline of drilling technology, standardized procedures without continuous 
adjustments are not very realistic due to the unpredictable nature of the well. Thus, it is 
difficult to picture that a fully automated MPD system without human involvement is 
possible. From a human factor point of view, the author suggests keeping the mode of 
automation similar to what it is today, mode 3. Then, the automated system provides a 
closed loop control for individual tasks while permitting the driller to manually take 
control in a well control incident. In this case, the machine can perform tasks that are 
beyond human capabilities, or best performed by machines, while keeping the operator 
in overall authority. This proposition is based on the hypothesis that better performance 
and SA is seen when keeping humans involved in system operation, than in higher 
degree of automated system, thus minimizing the out of the loop performance problem 
(Endsley & Kiris 1995). Also, a higher degree of automation makes it more demanding 
to manually take control (Endsley 1999). The MPD system is then employed to improve 
the performance during normal operations, while allowing the operator to intervene to 
varying degrees in case of abnormal operation 
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Improvements could, however, be directed to the setup of the different pumps, or the 
mud pumps and the backpressure pump, and the interface between the driller’s 
equipment and the MPD equipment. Either the equipment could be combined into one 
unit, or the operators could be situated closer together. This suggests a change in the 
design from today’s situation.  
 
5.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Methodology 
This section will evaluate the different methods applied to accomplish the thesis’ 
objectives. First, the pre-study and secondly, the different analyses will be evaluated.  
 
Pre-Study 
The pre-study contains technical professionals and researchers’ view on possibilities 
and challenges with MPD. The study was used to map the relevance of the topic 
explored. The limitation to the pre-study is the number of participants, which is 
associated with the fact that MPD is not currently a widely adopted method in Norway. 
More participants, also from the sharp end or those performing the operation, could 
have increased the consistency and given different opinions. Still, those who contributed 
to the pre-study are well-known to the concept through their work practice, which 
suggests that their answers are effective. The results from the pre-study was not directly 
used for further work in the thesis, however it provided confidence that MPD will have 
a place in future drilling technology. Thereby, it gives the overall topic of the thesis 
additional motivation to be studied.   
The pre-study adopts a qualitative approach, which means that the standard way of 
evaluating qualitative research, reliability and validity, are not easily applied. Instead, 
four criteria are generally used to establish the trustworthiness of qualitative research: 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability. The credibility of the pre-
study is suggested to be high as many of the participants gave similar answers to the 
two questions. However, the study only contains five participants which is a fairly low 
number. Hence, some of the statements are not verified. The findings from the pre-study 
could be transferred to other MPD operations with similar methods applied. However, 
parts of the study are only usable for constant bottom hole pressure (CBHP) and not for 
other varieties of MPD (i.e. statements about pressure variances). In regards to 
dependability, factors such as communication and decision-making will be individually 
specific, and dependent on the environment. The last criterion is conformability, which 
refers to the degree to which the results can be confirmed or corroborated by others. As 
many of the statements from the participant cannot be documented or confirmed by 
other, the conformability is suggested to be low.  
 
Human Factor Methods 
The human factor methods applied may form parts of a human reliability analysis and 
include functional analysis, allocation of functions, task analysis, and human error 
identification. The first limitation is the time available to confirm the results from the 
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different analyses. The timeframe also restricts the amount of research and number of 
analyses that could be performed. Another limitation is the lack of practical experience 
with the MPD system which affects the capability of the analyst, and the understanding 
of the results. Hands-on practice could have extended the results of the analysis, and 
contributed to finding different challenges that are currently described in the thesis. In 
regards to the HRA methods, a lack of relevant evaluation criteria for human-machine 
interfaces exists. The confidence of the study could have been increased with qualitative 
methodology.  
The functional analysis method FAST was used to map system functions critical for 
primary well control. This is a well-documented method which is easy to learn and easy 
to implement. It is more descriptive than analytic and provides a robust approach for 
identifying the functional architecture of the system. FAST does not give any scenario 
description which makes it unsuitable to use it without further analyses (Rausand 2013). 
As the method was employed in this thesis to give an overview and identify critical 
components for maintaining well control, the method is proposed to be a rigid choice. 
The analysis also gives a supportive start when examining human-machine interactions, 
and allocating functions to either human or machines.    
The allocation of functions’ main aim is to provide rational means to determine which 
system-level functions should be carried out by humans and which to be carried out by 
machines. In the design phase, allocation of functions is useful for determining the 
degree of automation that is optimal for a system. In this thesis, however, the method 
was employed to evaluate if the allocation of an existing system was sound. This was 
accomplished by comparing the functions against Fitts list. The procedure itself was 
easy to follow and well-structured. Additionally, the different capabilities of humans 
and machines in Fitts list were not difficult to associate to the set of functions. However, 
the evaluation of the results is more a challenge due to some limitations of the method. 
For example, the allocation does not display the direct interactions between the different 
operations, and therefore, does not say enough about workload, or if the interaction is 
good or not. Still, the allocation of functions gave a well indication of change in mode 
of automation from normal drilling to a lost circulation event, which was part of the 
objectives.  
An additional limitation of Fitts list is that it does not consider the psychological needs 
of the human (affective and emotional requirements, job satisfaction, motivation, 
fatigue, stress, working under time pressure), temporal effects (learning, contextual 
variations), individual differences, safety, economic utility, availability, maintainability, 
the rapid evolution of technology, social values, task complexity, and 
interconnectedness between functions (de Winter & Dodou 2011; Hancock & Scallen 
1998). Some of these factors could have an impact on how the driller and the MPD 
operator perceive the surroundings and how they act in different situations. In a HRA, 
these factors are identified as performance shaping factors, which are factors that may 
influence human performance, and thereby human error or reliability. HRA are using 
these factors to increase or decrease the probability of human error.  
The task analysis, HTA, was used to decompose the tasks needed to be performed in 
order to deal with lost circulation. HTA is an easy to learn method where the analyst is 
given insight into the main task being analyzed. The procedure is flexible such that the 
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tasks can be analyzed to any required level of detail. On its own, the method does not 
provide results for evaluating applicability; however, it highlights which tasks to be 
performed by different operators. The hierarchical structure of the analysis enables the 
analyst to progressively redescribe the activity in great degree of detail. However, this 
can be time-consuming work and dependent on the capabilities of the analyst. The 
resulting overview may be complex. HTA is most commonly used as a starting point for 
further analyses, like SHERPA, and the method is therefore suitable for the thesis’ main 
objective: to evaluate human errors. A scenario analysis could also have been performed 
using STEP-diagram, as a part of a CRIOP analysis. The latter was developed for the 
offshore industry (Johnsen et al. 2004). However, CRIOP does not give a detailed 
enough analysis for this thesis. 
The human error identification method, SHERPA, was applied to identify credible 
human errors for each task in the HTA. SHERPA is a structured and comprehensive 
method that is well documented and supported by a checklist for each step. However, 
despite the fact that SHERPA is a structured technique, a great deal of reliance lies upon 
the judgment of the analyst as to which errors is credible in any given situation. The 
method is simple and does not require in-depth knowledge of human reliability or 
cognitive psychology. The latter is also seen as a limitation as it does not consider 
cognitive components of the error mechanism. Lastly, it only considers error at the 
―sharp end‖ of the system operation, which suggests that the analyses should be 
supplemented with SPAR-H, which is a structured approach to identify and assess the 
potential for human error in complex tasks including calculating the probability of 
errors (van de Merwe et al. 2012).   
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6 Conclusions and Further Work 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine automated Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD) and 
how it may influence the risk of well control incidents by the influence on human 
errors. The MPD system, Constant Bottom Hole Pressure, supplied by Halliburton was 
used as a case, with the critical well control incident, lost circulation, used as a scenario. 
MPD was introduced to the petroleum industry following a demand of new technologies 
to drill narrow mud window formations, such as depleted reservoirs. In addition to the 
traditional mud column, MPD utilizes applied pressure from surface in a closed 
circulating system as the primary well barrier. More accurate pressure control 
equipment, and earlier kicks and loss detection methods are believed to mitigate risks of 
well control incidents, hence an increase in safety. Currently, MPD is only used on the 
most challenging wells due to high operational costs. 
Experience from various industries, such as the aviation industry, have demonstrated 
that automation of previously manual operations may introduce new types of hazards 
and risks. For instance, changes in task demands, workload, trust and reliance in the 
automation, and mode confusion could influence the risk of human errors. However, 
incorporating the human element in risk assessment is thought to increase safety and 
enhances the quality of the drilling operation. The Facility Regulations in Petroleum 
Safety Authority states that equipment shall be designed such that the possibility of 
human errors is limited. The Norwegian petroleum standard (NORSOK S-002) requires 
during the concept phase that a functional analysis, allocation description functions, and 
a task analysis should be performed.  
During the functional analysis, it was established that maintaining BHP within drilling 
window is more complex for MPD operation than for conventional drilling. The MPD 
system requires a dedicated control system, and a dynamic and static pressure control 
equipment, with its respective components, to achieve automatic influence. The 
segments developed for automation are the backpressure pump and the automatic choke, 
which lends to mode 3 ―Management by Delegation. The allocation of function analysis 
identifies that a manual takeover of the backpressure pump and the MPD choke is 
motivated by a lost circulation event, which changes the management style to mode 1 
―Assisted Manual Control‖. An additional finding in both the allocation of function 
method and the task analysis was a frequent and dynamic change in task/function 
responsibility between the driller and the MPD operator. The increase in complexity of 
the system and change in mode of automation, coupled with team-work previously not 
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found in traditional drilling methods may, suggest that an enhanced focus on 
communication, ambiguous information, and decision-making is vital. 
The most severe consequence for the well identified in the human error identification 
method, SHERPA, was that bottomhole pressure was not maintained, such that 
occurrence of a kick develops into a blowout. Failure of filling the well adequately with 
mud, with the driller not closing the blowout-preventer, were established as possible 
causes. When excluding system failures, these events could be traced to 
miscommunication and mistaken judgments, or an inadequate procedure. It has not been 
found a clear description as to when the driller should close the blowout-preventer if 
losses become too severe. This discovery is, however, limited by the information 
available, and time to confirm the results. These findings combined with factors such as 
increased memory demand, more screens to pay attention to, and changed types of tasks 
could suggest that handling lost circulation is more complex for an MPD operation than 
a traditional procedure. In addition, the interaction between the driller and the MPD 
operator with their respective tasks may introduce new types of human errors that could 
influence the risk of well control incidents. Still, the MPD equipment offers a more 
precise adjustment of the BHP proposing that some well control incidents are less 
challenging to handle.  
A future mode of automation in MPD systems is recommended to be similar to today’s 
situation. A flexible interaction between humans and automation is assumed to provide 
benefits like improved situation awareness, improved workload, and improved overall 
human-machine performance relative to either human alone or machine alone. The 
operation is then enhanced during normal conditions, while allowing the operator to 
intervene to varying degrees in case of abnormal operation. Upcoming drilling practices 
is believed to change, and MPD is regarded as a necessary building block in the 
automated drilling scenario. Other industries, such as the nuclear energy industry, have 
come further than the petroleum industry in integrating human factors into major 
accident risk analysis. An encouragement to pursue this development is suggested, as 
incorporation of the human element in major accident risk analyses is viewed as a 
promising path to improved safety and reliability of safety- critical systems. 
 
Further Work 
Although the results presented here have demonstrated the effectiveness of adding the 
human element in addressing risks, it could be further developed in a number of ways. 
Further work is suggested as follows:  
- A complete Human Reliability Analysis should be performed to increase the 
confidence, which means to include performance-influencing factors (e.g. 
SPAR-H) and human error probabilities for each error mode (e.g. THERP). 
These could be used to quantify the potential of credible human error, identify 
causes of human error to support development of preventative measures, and 
improving the value of a risk assessment by including the human element 
(Swain 1990). 
 
- The human-machine interaction, or more specific the human-human-machine 
interaction, should be further analyzed as this was identified as vulnerable for 
Conclusions and Further Work 
73 
 
the operation to deal with lost circulation. With the existing system, elements 
such as procedures and training should be looked upon. These are components 
of organizational factors (Skogdalen & Vinnem 2011). NORSOK Z-013 states 
that an evaluation of the effect of human and organizational factors shall be 
performed. This may range from a qualitative discussion to a detailed analysis of 
human and organizational errors, depending on the criticality of such aspects for 
the risk picture 
 
- The redundancies of the MPD system should be examined in regards to well 
control. Failure modes and effect analysis (FMECA) can be used to evaluate the 
reliability, in addition to hazard and operability (HAZOP) to evaluate all 
deviations the system may have (Rausand 2013).  
  
- Finally, it is recognized that the industry is swiftly changing, also within the 
development MPD technology. Zhou et al. (2011) has described a switched 
control scheme which is believed to attenuate kicks while drilling into the 
reservoir. Another research propose to enhance well control by using wired drill 
pipe telemetry which enables more accurate downhole data compared to the 
traditional mud pulses (Gravdal et al. 2010). Landet (2011) is modeling control 
of MPD from floating rigs suggesting that the practice will expand to not only 
platforms. The Human Factor community should follow-up this development to 
provide consultation from a safety point of view. 
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8 Appendix A 
AFA  Adaptive functional allocation 
BHA  Bottomhole assembly 
BHP  Bottomhole pressure 
BOP  Blowout-preventer 
DAS   Data acquisition aystem 
ECD   Equivalent circulating density  
FAST  Functional analysis system technique 
LC  Lost circulation 
LCM  Lost circulation materials 
HMI  Human-machine interface 
HRA  Human reliability analysis 
HRI  Human error identification 
HTA  Hierarchical task analysis 
MPD  Managed pressure drilling 
MWD  Measurement while drilling 
NPT  Non-productive time 
P&ID  Piping and instrumentation diagram/drawing 
PSA   Petroleum Safety Authority  
RCD  Rotary control device 
SHERPA  Systematic human error reduction and prediction approach 
ROP  Rate of penetration 
SA   Situation awareness 
TVD  True vertical depth 
WB  Wellbore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
